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Infrastructure system is the backbone of the economy. However, large gap be-
tween demand and supply is observed in both developed and under-developed
countries. Such gap is induced by two reasons, lack of fund invested in in-
frastructure procurement and low procurement efficiency due to corruption.
Closing this gap can improve the economy of a country, help business to thrive
and make citizens better off. This dissertation focuses on dealing with the low
procurement efficiency in the context of private participation in infrastructure
procurement. Based on literature review, stakeholder management, decentral-
ization and agency problem is identified as three key fields in tackling corrup-
tion problem. Therefore, a framework incorporating these three fields is built.
Based on hierarchical principal-agent model and highway pricing model, such
a framework also bridges the engineering and economic models. Several vi-
tal problems in post-tender phase of infrastructure procurement are studied.
Cost overrun is a problem plaguing all the infrastructure projects and using the
framework, a model is established to distinguish the unintentional cost overrun
due to technical uncertainty and intentional one induced by selfish motivation
of official. The corruption in renegotiation of PPP projects is also investigated.
Different scenarios based on the institutional monitoring and anti-corruption
governmental contract are studied. This dissertation’s contribution is three-
fold: Firstly, a framework connecting two dimensions, that is, horizontally the
stakeholder management, decentralization and agency problems and vertically
the engineering and economic models, is established. Secondly, the corruption
problems in post-tender phase of infrastructure project are addressed, given that
previous research in such field is limited. Thirdly, Several important policy in-
sights are provided in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Preliminary remarks
Infrastructure encompasses roads and bridges connecting cities, water-main de-
livering to households, hospitals and schools supporting communities, and all
other similar systems serving as backbones of the society. As pointed out by
American Society of Civil Engineering (ASCE) in their annual Infrastructure Re-
port Card “Every family, every community and every business needs infrastruc-
ture to thrive”.
Despite its importance, there is still a huge deficit in infrastructure supply.
Taking U.S. road system as an example. In 2013, 32% of US major roads are
in poor or mediocre condition and 42% of US major highways are congested.
Similar examples can be found in under-developed countries (ASCE, Infrastruc-
ture Report Card). For example, World Bank reports that only one-third of sub-
Saharan African people living within two kilometers of all-season roads, com-
pared to two-thirds in other developing regions.
Infrastructure deficit indicates demand of infrastructure exceeding its sup-
ply. To deal with such deficit, however, the government can do little to restrain
the demand but can only focus on the supply side.1 The supply side is the level
of infrastructure, which consists of fund invested into the infrastructure and the
procurement efficiency of the fund, as shown in 1.1.
1Although there are evidences that the demand of toll free highway may be irrational to
some extent, such demand is only small fraction in total demand [63].
1
Deficit = Demand − Supply
?
Fund
invested
× Procurementefficiency
Figure 1.1: Infrastructure deficit
On one hand, the fund invested into the infrastructure system is also expe-
riencing huge deficit. According to the estimation of Federal Highway Admin-
istration, between 2008 and 2028, annual investment into the US road system
should be at least $170 billion, however, the real investment is only $91 billion.
Some solutions, such as private participation, are introduced.
On the other hand, the procurement efficiency is never satisfying. Corrup-
tion, regarded as biggest problem, consumes a large part of fund invested into
the system. According to [46], 10 − 30% total investment into public infrastruc-
ture may have been lost through corruption. Annual loss in global construction
industry through problems such as inefficiency and corruption could reach $2.5
trillion by 2020. However, there is no straight-forward solution to corruption
problems.
Delivering infrastructure remains one of the biggest challenges in public pro-
curement as it usually involves economic, political, social and technical consid-
erations. Contracts are complex and prone to changes and renegotiations. The
design is usually highly localized and therefore requires decentralized procure-
ment. Therefore, infrastructure procurement is regarded as one of the area that
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easily breeds corruption related problems, especially in developing countries.
This dissertation establishes approaches to model the formation of corrup-
tion in infrastructure procurement and provides several possible solutions for
the community. This chapter serves as the introduction. In the following sec-
tions, I first explore the corruption problem currently lying in infrastructure pro-
curement process. Then discuss how to capture different features of infrastruc-
ture procurement in a model. Based on the features I discussed, principal-agent
model is identified as the best model to be used. Therefore, in the following
section, the concepts of principal-agent model are introduced. Finally, I briefly
introduce the organization of this dissertation.
1.2 Corruption in infrastructure procurement
Corruption, defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Trans-
parency International), is one of the major problems associated with infrastruc-
ture projects. Corruption induces inefficient political institutions, neutralizes
economic gain, destroys social trust or even destruct the environment ([72],
[47]). Therefore, fighting against corruption in infrastructure projects is essen-
tial to secure the public interest and well functioning of this advanced form of
public procurement.
Corruption can happen in all stages of life cycle of an infrastructure project
which can be divided into pre-tender (decision making), tender and post-tender
(contract execution) phases (shown in Figure 1.2). A more detailed five-stage
model ([29]) is also given in the same figure for comparison. Pre-tender phase
consists of designing market and making financing decisions. In tender phase,
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the governments hold auctions to decide who will be awarded with the con-
tract. In post-tender phase, the infrastructure is constructed and services are
delivered. Pre-tender and tender phases corruptions are both well studied and
comprehensively regulated ([48]). In pre-tender phase, the corruption may in-
fluence the choice of projects ([27]). Hence the research and regulation regard-
ing pre-tender phase corruption focus on these issues. The tender phase is also
prone to corruption. Topics of studies include the form of tendering, contract
awarding criteria and also how corruption undermines the efficiency of the in-
frastructure project ([2], [28], [17]).
Pre-tender phase
Tender phase
Post-tender phase
Market Design
Financing Decision
Procurement
Construction
Delivery of Service
Figure 1.2: Stages of infrastructure procurement
In contrast to the massive effort invested in the study and regulation of pre-
tender and tender phases corruption, misdeeds in post-tender session receive
insufficient attention from both academia and governments. However, past
research (for example, [48] and references therein) showed that corruption in
contract execution stage is more severe than that in the pre-tender and tender
phases. Despite of this, knowledge about post-tender phase corruption is still
limited. To our best knowledge, the only detailed discussion under the context
is [48]. They discuss how to alter the payment scheme and risk allocation in
4
projects with contingent contract to reduce corruption after the contract being
awarded. In their model, a contractor is selected to procure the infrastructure
for a central government, who delegates the administration to an local official.
The project’s revenue is influenced by both the effort of the contractor and the
exogenous shock which is a private information of the contractor. The local of-
ficial may have knowledge on the exogenous shock with some possibility and
whether she possesses such information is privately known by herself. With the
presence of asymmetric information, the official is able to collude with the con-
tractor. Based on these settings, the authors discuss an anti-corruption program
that awarding the official for providing informative report.
One of the major sources of corruption in infrastructure projects, as pointed
out in [40] and [53], is the renegotiation of the initial contract, which usually
takes place in contract execution phase. There are two types of renegotia-
tion, operator-led renegotiation and government-led renegotiation. Operator-
led renegotiation usually happens after economic shock hitting the operator of
the project who thereafter initiate renegotiation for possible relief. Government-
led renegotiation, on the other hand, reflects change in the priority or economic
environment. In either form of renegotiation, the official can collude with the
other parties to solicit bribery or other personal benefit. For example, although
government-led renegotiation is claimed to be Pareto improving, it is sometimes
featured with opportunism in the sense that the officials leading the renegotia-
tion seek to please their voters during or after elections.
Several papers explore outcomes of renegotiation with or without the pres-
ence of selfish official. Nevertheless, the research about collusion in the renego-
tiation game is absent. In [26], the authors discuss the officials using contract
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and renegotiation as an approach to circumvent the budget constraint during
their terms of office. They report that the firms will low-ball their offer dur-
ing the tender phase and additional work will be added through renegotiation
at the start of contract execution phase. By this way, part of the cost is trans-
ferred to future officials and not borne by incumbent. Although in their paper,
the official is not benevolent, they do not consider the situation when officials
collude with the contractor. Another paper covering the behavior of officials
during renegotiation game is [43]. The author considers a operator-led renego-
tiation where the official is benevolent. In his model, the operator could ask the
government to bail him out from an economic shock. The author examines the
effectiveness of different government procurement policies.
In summary, although the post-tender phase is regarded as at least, if not
more, important as pre-tender and tender phases in preventing corruption in in-
frastructure projects, the study of collusion and corruption is limited and, what
is worse, the study of collusion in renegotiation is absent. This fact seems to be
more surprising if one also notices that literature of collusion in renegotiation-
process-alike games is actually abundant.
1.3 Research of corruption in general
Corruption happens when private and public interests overlap. There are two
levels of corruption: petty and grand corruption ([62]). Petty corruption is low-
level corruption happens where basic law and regulations are in place. The offi-
cials in a petty corruption seize chances to benefit themselves. Petty corruption
may happen when the resource is scarce, the discretion power to select quali-
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fied or unqualified agents is held by officials, or the agents hope to get better
service. On the other hand, the grand corruption, sharing some common prop-
erties with petty corruption, is featured with corrupting the how public sector,
government or system. For example, the public sector can be designed to be
a rent-extraction machine through high-level corruption, the electoral system’s
outcome is determined by money, or the assets are transferred and projects en-
gaged by government have significant effect on the wealth of business. Petty
and grand corruption are of equal importance. In this dissertation, I will focus
on discussion of petty corruption.
The literature on corruption in general focuses on the debate of relation-
ship between corruption and economic growth [62]. This includes discussion in
two dimensions: whether corruption induces low growth rate and whether eco-
nomic growth can cure corruption problem. To answer these two questions, two
branches of studies are conducted. Empirical study, on one hand, try to identify
the linkage between economic growth and corruption in real world countries.
However, for illegal activities such as bribe, it is difficult to directly collect data
or evidence. Therefore, indirect measures ([50]) or field experiments([60]) are
widely adapted in research. However, as pointed by [36], forensic economic
methodologies can hardly investigate into the corruption problem because it is
impossible to establish the intentions of the actor involved.
On the other hand, theoretical research focus on testing the black box be-
tween institutional measures and economic outcome. Literature of this class
studies the interaction between public official and private agent ([32], [68], [49]),
interaction between public official and voters ([51], [21], [42], [67], [67]), decen-
tralization ([7], [8], [6], [22], [65]) and agent problems ([55], [19], [10], [3], [4]).
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1.4 Research of corruption in infrastructure procurement
Corruption in infrastructure procurement is also widely studied. As infrastruc-
ture is identified to be important to economic growth ([1]), study of corruption
in infrastructure narrow down the debate around corruption and growth to cor-
ruption and infrastructure level. Similar to study of corruption in general sense,
the literature in infrastructure scope can also be divided into empirical and the-
oretical branches. On the theoretical side, the research focus can be divided into
three fields.
Stakeholder management. Stakeholders of infrastructure projects can be di-
vided into by two dimensions: public vs. private, and internal vs. external,
as shown in Figure 1.3. Among them, researchers usually play an indirect and
long term role in the projects and therefore we don’t consider them in this dis-
sertation. Government, contractor and residents, however, are all incorporated
into the framework of this dissertation. Previous studies in stakeholder man-
agement discover that failure of public infrastructure projects are always sub-
jected to opposition from various stakeholders ([76]). Major stakeholders in-
clude government official, procurer, the residents (public) and also researchers
in this area. Stakeholders may have informal power to influence the decision on
the infrastructure, for example the public can put pressure on other stakehold-
ers to change their position in the infrastructure project ([59]).
Decentralization. Another stream of research falls in decentralized procure-
ment. In public infrastructure procurement, two distinct types of institutional
organization are relied on: decentralized and centralized procurement. In de-
centralized procurement, decisions are delegated such that selection, financ-
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Public
Private
Internal External
Government Residents
Contractor Researcher
Figure 1.3: Classification of stakeholders
ing and implementation are responsibility of subnational governments or de-
partments. On the contrary, centralized procurement is featured with central
government completely control the decision rights([38], Chapter 1.). Infrastruc-
ture projects with private participation usually are implemented distributively
in subnational governments. Despite the possible benefits of decentralization,
it is well-accepted that, corruption is more prominent in decentralized public
infrastructure procurement compared to centralized counterparts. Decentral-
ized procurement breeds corruption due to several reasons ([38], Chapter 14.).
Firstly, decentralization may induce personalism and interest group capture. As
localization brings official closer to citizens and hence reduces professionalism.
The official may pay attention to the need of individuals or a group of citizens
and ignore the local residents as a whole. Secondly, decentralized procurement
decision weakens the central government monitor and control. The effective-
ness of central government auditing decreases as the decisions are distributed
and bureaucrats can collude to achieve self-interest. Lastly, political decentral-
ization can also facilitate corruption, especially when the local government does
not play a supportive role in the enterprise.
Agency problem. Agency problem arises in infrastructure procurement when
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the interests of different stakeholders are conflicting and information asymme-
try exists. Therefore, literature in this field focuses on how a benevolent gov-
ernment can overcome the information asymmetry and align the interest of dif-
ferent parties to deliver a social optimal projects. The study in this field is pio-
neered by [71], which introduces the collusion between agents or between agent
and supervisor in a hierarchical organization (for a complete review in this field,
we refer to [56]). The models in this field usually consider different players in-
cluding principal, supervisor and agent (One typical model is discussed in Sec-
tion 1.5). The colluding agents and supervisors can sign side contract with each
other and realize hidden transfer to take advantage of the private information
they possess. [48] is the first paper applying such framework to corruption in
post-tender phase of projects to our best knowledge. In their paper, they build
a central government - local official - contractor model to reflect the decentral-
ized procurement and study how the central government can prevent collusion
between local official and contractor with the presence of both adverse selection
and moral hazard problems.
Based on the literature review, we can classify the existing literature into the
following matrix in Figure 1.4 (For simplicity, only a fraction of highly cited
papers is shown). From this matrix, several interesting observations are easily
made:
• There is no uniform framework addressing all three fields
• A big gap exists between stakeholder management and other two field
• less attention is paid to post-tender phase corruption
• There is weak connection between engineering and economic models
10
Stakeholder
management
Decentra-
lization
Agency
problem
Pre-tender Tender Post-tender
Ng et al. (2007)
Ng et al. (2012)
Flyvbjerg et al. (1999)
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002)
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003)
Hu et al. (2015)
El-Gohary et al. (2006)
Shah (1999, 2005)
Andrew et al. (2005)
Arikan (2004)
Waller et al. (2002)
Shah (2006)
Batley (1999)
Von Maravic (2003)
Scharpf (1997)
Hart (2003)
Bennett et al. (2006)
Martimort et al. (2008)
Engel (2011)
Bajari et al. (2010)
Yescombe(2007)
Auriol(2006)
Burguet et al. (2005)
Estache et al. (2009)
Iossa et al (2011)
Figure 1.4: Existing Literature
This dissertation focuses on solving these problems in existing literature. To
overcome these obstacles, principal-agent model is used. In the following sec-
tion, I will briefly review the existing literature in principal-agent model.
1.5 Principal-agent model in dealing with corruption and col-
lusion
Principal-agent model is the mostly adopted model in research of corruption in
public infrastructure procurement or even corruption in general. The basic as-
sumption in this model is that government, referred as ‘principal’ in the model,
is benevolent and resourceful and aims on achieving maximal social welfare,
the sum of utilities of the society. On the other hand, however, agents are self-
motivated and seek to increase own benefit (See [11], [13], and [12]). The litera-
ture suggests that corruption can be curbed by increasing the expected penalty
11
for misconduct.
In the literature of corruption, there is a stream of research focusing on mod-
eling the decentralization using hierarchical principal-agent model. [71] estab-
lishes a classic three-tier principal-supervisor-agent model to analyze the impact
of decentralization and information asymmetry on corruption behavior. The ex-
tensions, including four-tier hierarchical model by [19], multiple agents model
by [56], different information condition by [20] and [30], illustrates its useful-
ness. Such models help us understand how different conditions will affect the
outcome of collusion and corruption which is unavailable to researchers and
government in the real world.
A majority of such studies in collusion compares two different organization
forms, centralization and delegation, when collusion presents.2 3 In central-
ization, the principal directly offer contract to the productive agents while in
delegation, the principal interacts only with some supervisor who thereafter
contract with other agents. In such environment, collusion is inevitable if we
assume that the supervisor is motivated by personal gain. The supervisor can
side contract with the agents for misreporting their private information and ask
for bribes. Scholars report that under different assumption of information struc-
tures, delegation can achieve same outcome as ([30]), or strictly worse than
([20]), centralization. Cases of multiple agents are also discussed. In [56], the
authors consider the principal hires a supervisor to monitor two productive
agents. The principal then consider whether he should directly contract with
the two agents or delegate the right to the supervisor. In their paper, the au-
2In a larger scope of literature, the centralization and delegation is compared without the
strategic behavior. For a good literature review in this area, refer to [56].
3Also, there is plenty of literature assuming soft information and/or breachable side contract,
which is different from Tirole’s framework. Introduction part of [31] provides a comprehensive
review.
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thors identify the condition when delegation to an informed supervisor would
be superior to direct contract even with the risk of collusion.
One typical model is shown in Figure 1.5. The following numerical examples
are used to illustrate the basic idea of the models in this chapter.
Principal
Supervisor
Agent
Un-informed
Benevolent
Hard info: σ = {∅, θ},
or Soft info: σ ∈ Θ
Selfish
Private info: θ ∈ Θ
Productivity, Cost, Effort, etc.
Selfish
Contract
Contract
Side
Contract
Figure 1.5: A typical principal-supervisor-agent model
Example 1. Assume that in Figure 1.6, there is no supervisor, that is the agent
directly contract with principal. The private information of agent is his procurement
cost per unit output, Θ = {0.1, 0.2}. Given output x, the cost is C = θx. Also, assume
that the utility given the output is
√
x. The social welfare is therefore U =
√
x − θx. If
principal possesses full information, the optimal output is (subscripts 0.1 and 0.2 denote
the corresponding cost) x∗0.1 = 25 and x
∗
0.2 = 6.25. This gives that the social welfare being
U∗0.1 = 2.5 and U
∗
0.2 = 1.25. If principal does not know the exact cost, she can only let
the agent to report. However, the agent, being selfish, will not necessarily report true
information. For example, he can report θ˜ = 0.2 when his real cost is θ = 0.1. Given
this wrong information, the principal will implement x∗0.2 = 6.25 and the agent will get
a payment of 1.25 while he only spends 0.625 in production, which means that he makes
a profit of 0.625.
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Therefore, principal can only sign an incentive contract with the agent. The contract
stipulate the output x = x(θ˜) and monetary transfer t(θ˜) given the report from the agent
θ˜. Such a contract should at least satisfy the following two properties: Under any
circumstances, the agent will 1. be willing to participate and 2. get higher or same
utility for truth-telling than lying. Given these two requirements, the optimal solution
now becomes xs0.1 = 25 and x
s
0.2 = 2.8. The social welfare decreases to U
s
0.1 = 2.22
and U s0.2 = 0.55. This indicates that the optimal output for efficient type (θ = 0.1)
remains the same but is lower for inefficient type. Social welfare under both condition
decreases, however due to different reasons. When agent is efficient, the social welfare
decreases because monetary transfer. On the other hand, the social welfare decreases due
to suboptimal output compared to optimal case.
Principal
Agent
Un-informed√
x − t(θ˜)
Private info: θ ∈ Θ = {0.1, 0.2}
Cost of production: θx
Profit: t(θ˜) − θx
Report from agent: θ˜
Output: x = x(θ˜)
Monetary transfer: t(θ˜)
Contract
Figure 1.6: Model of Example 1
The above example illustrates how information asymmetry will affect the
social welfare and optimal output. The requirements 1 and 2 in the example
are called individual rationality and incentive compatibility, respectively, in lit-
erature of mechanism design. For a comprehensive introduction of mechanism
design, please refer to [74].
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One possible solution to the asymmetric information problem is introducing
the supervisor, as in Figure 1.5, who is informed on the agents efficiency but is
still rational. Therefore, similar to previous case, principal has to provide the
supervisor with incentive to tell the truth. Although this seems to be a promis-
ing way to solve the problem, surprisingly, previous literature has proven that
under most of the circumstances, it performs no better than the organization in
Figure 1.6 ([20], [30], [56]). We will discuss a more complex case of Figure 1.5 in
Chapter 3.
1.6 Organization of this dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 builds a model to analyze the cost overrun problem in public
procurement. Cost overrun problem was, is and will be plaguing public in-
frastructure projects. It could be induced by technical uncertainty or political
and economic drivers. To determine the root cause of cost overrun, We build
a two-stage model to evaluate the impact of these drivers under user hetero-
geneity context where decisions are made by benevolent or selfish officers. We
identify that there are two distinct types of cost overrun: ex-ante and ex-post
cost overrun. Although cost overrun is widely regarded as unavoidable with
the presence of technical inaccuracy, the problem induced by purely unselfish
drivers, such as technical imperfectness consists of both types of cost overrun
with same significance and minimal negative impact. On the contrary, the cost
overrun induced by selfishness, such as economic motivation or political imper-
fectness is biased towards one side and the extent of cost overrun is larger. We
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also investigate the effectiveness of audit to address imperfectness within deci-
sion process and the requirement for the central government to effectively reg-
ulate both types of cost overrun. Although we mainly focus on transportation
infrastructure project in this chapter, our modeling framework can comprehen-
sively account the cost overrun problem in a wide variety of public infrastruc-
ture projects.
Chapter 3 discusses the post-tender phase renegotiation in Public-Private
Partnership(PPP). Corruption is widely accepted as a major problem plaguing
PPP projects and annihilating most of their potential benefits. It is believed that
the corruption in post-tender phase of PPP is more severe than other phases in
the life cycle of the projects. In this chapter we study corruption in government-
led renegotiation process in the post-tender phase of PPP. A highway serving
heterogeneous residents is built by central government through PPP with a
contractor in an uncertain environment. After the resolution of uncertainty, a
change in design of the highway can be made through renegotiation process in
post-tender phase to make all parties, i.e. central government, residents and
contractor, to be better-off. The central or state governments cannot interact
with each contractor or residents group within their jurisdiction on account of
administration cost. Therefore, such decision is delegated to a local official,
which leaves the official the opportunity to collude with the other two par-
ties and seek for possible personal gain. We derive a general social optimal
design of highway under user heterogeneity is derived with the presence of
asymmetric information. Based on the results, outcomes of different renegoti-
ation games with various types of local officials are provided. Our derivation
and results provide several important policy implications and regulatory guide-
lines, including that the official will be more likely to renegotiate the contract if
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she can collude with both parties than only one party, restricting official’s col-
luding ability to only part of residents group will reduce social welfare loss,
and corruption can be detected through whether renegotiation is declined by
the residents group or contractor. Beyond its contribution to PPP literature, this
chapter enriches the mechanism design and collusion theories with a model
containing both consumer and producer. Also, our model links existing eco-
nomic and engineering models in PPP literature and provides a uniform and
useful framework for future discussion.
Chapter 4 establishes a comprehensive framework taking stakeholder man-
agement, decentralization and agency problem into consideration. Private par-
ticipation is increasingly important in public infrastructure procurement. De-
spite various benefit it contributes to the society, corruption, which is one of the
most prominent problems, neutralizes its advantages. We identify that to fight
the corruption, stakeholder management, decentralization and agency problem
are key components of the research. Infrastructure projects naturally have huge
impact on majority of stakeholders, who in turn would find influencing the
decision to favor themselves. Also, decisions are usually delegated to subna-
tional governments, which is widely regarded as potential source of miscon-
duct. Moreover, the agency problem is featured as asymmetric information
where officials deliberately hide private information of other agents from the
central government to seek bribe in return. Therefore, in this chapter, a frame-
work that addresses these issues are built and applied to the post-tender phase
renegotiation of PPP, where corruption is as severe as tender and pre-tender
phase but has drawn insufficient attention. Through the lens of our model, we
discover that that lower private side bargain power, lower estimated cost in
design phase, and possibility of colluding with free riders will facilitate corrup-
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tion. Also, we discover that governmental incentive contract can not fully pre-
vent corruption behavior and therefore auditing and monitoring agents should
be relied upon to curb misconduct of officials.
Chapter 5 serves as conclusion and points out possible future research direc-
tion.
The full framework of this chapter is given in Figure 1.7.
Central Government
Official
Contractor Residents
Infrastructure
Monitoring Governmental ContractFunding
DecisionFunding
Toll
User Fee
Bargain Power (Re-)election concern
User
Heterogeneity
Private
Info on Cost
Ownership
Supervisory
Info
Stakeholder Management
Agency Problem
Decentralization
Figure 1.7: Research Framework
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CHAPTER 2
SELFISH OFFICIAL AND COST OVERRUN IN INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT
2.1 Introduction
Cost overrun is prevailing in public infrastructure projects and it was already
widely studied since 1970 (for example, [54]). [35] report that 9 out of every 10
mega projects suffered from cost overrun. Existing literature attempted to iden-
tify different causal factors of the problem. There are mainly two categories of
factors: a. political and economic drivers, and, b. technical uncertainty. Discus-
sion about technical uncertainty applying forecast theory, planning theory and
decision-making theory to study how uncertainty in future situation, improper
or poor design and inappropriate institutional organization fail in controlling
the spending of an infrastructure project [35]. That is being said, the excess of
spending is due to ‘honest mistake’ rather than an intent to cheat. Many studies
explore the impact of technical uncertainty on cost overruns. For example, [57]
conclude that inadequate project preparation, planning and implementation is
the main factor of cost inducing cost overrun. [75] consider lack of experience
and techniques in forecasting future as a main source of cost overrun.
On the other hand, political and economic drivers originate from selfish mo-
tivation. For example, as lower cost estimation translates to higher likelihood of
project implementation, agencies who benefit from the project’s life cycle would
have incentives to intentionally provide lower forecasts [35]. Another exam-
ple would be cost estimation being intentionally costumed by politically driven
reasons [33]. To get a questioned project started, the public exposure of cost
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escalation resulting from possible delays, accidents, project changes, etc is min-
imized. Such motivation may exist among third-party consultants, construction
firms, other project promoters and forecasters, or even the government officers.
The latter one may be inclined to build her own political capital through the in-
frastructure project and thus will be motivated to promote the project by hiding
its cost. More surprisingly, although cost overrun is usually viewed as a harm
to public interest, it may also be driven by public interest - project with lower
cost estimation is more attractive and will be more likely to win access to public
fund provided by federal governments, which is referred as pork-barrel politics
[66].
Despite the intensive study on this topic, lessons are not sufficiently learned.
According to [35], cost underestimation problem is not effectively improved
over time. On one hand, with the advance in technology, there is a trend that
cost estimation is improved along the time. However, there is no evidence that
problems driven by selfish motivation are alleviated [41]. This is because, in
contrast to technical uncertainty, directly uncovering political and economic
drivers behind projects with cost overrun through empirical approaches is dif-
ficult, if not impossible. Public infrastructure projects are not transparent in the
sense that contract and other information are not readily available to the public
[73]. Furthermore, direct interview to decision makers on cost overrun topics
is also infeasible because exposing political and economic drivers will put the
decision makers’ interests (such as reputation and political life) at risk. There-
fore, indirect indicator and explanation should be relied upon to reveal potential
drivers.
Theoretical modeling is necessary in locating these indicators. However,
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there is limited number of studies focusing on theoretical explanation of the
motivation. [39] used a two-stage model with multiple agents to show that un-
derinvestment may be beneficial to the sponsor because it increases the compe-
tition in the environment. [70] considered a dynamic multi-stage model where
costs of the project are incurred over time during the construction and lead to an
uncertain stream of payoff upon completion of the construction. All the studies
mentioned above assume a benevolent decision maker which is insufficient in
the exploration of indirect indicator on selfish drivers. Selfish decision maker
should be incorporate in the model to locate possible indirect thread of cost
overrun.
2.2 The model
In this section, we will first introduce the modeling framework for cost overrun
analysis. Then we apply this framework to transportation infrastructure man-
agement problem and discuss the underlying models we use. Although in this
chapter we only talk about transportation infrastructure project, this framework
could be applied to various categories of infrastructure projects.
2.2.1 Modeling framework
In general, the infrastructure is directly procured by government who will con-
struct, maintain and operate it for the whole life-cycle. The main funding source
to cover costs incurred during the procurement is government’s tax revenue.
Then upon completion of construction the infrastructure will be available for
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public use for free. Public users (commuters, professional drivers etc.) is better
off by having access to new infrastructure.
In this chapter, we establish a three-factor-two-stage model to describe this
procurement process and attempt to provide insights through this model.
Three factors: Government agent, public and infrastructure
In infrastructure procurement, the decision made during building and operat-
ing phase would influence the local residents’ attitude toward the administra-
tion. There are many factors that could influence such attitude, e.g. spending,
user experience, environment friendliness, etc. Among them, spending is an
important one. As part of the funding source of highway comes from the tax
of local residents, heavy infrastructure spending is usually seen as a sign of tax
rate hiking in future. Thus, lavish infrastructure spending is usually unfavor-
able from the perspective of households who are not directly benefited from.
User experience, on the other hand, will also influence local residents, espe-
cially users, i.e. who are directly benefited from the project. Although infras-
tructure almost always makes the whole system more accessible, sometimes bad
user experience will negatively affect the satisfactory of travelers. Poorly con-
structed or maintained road, insufficient safety measures, or even unexpected
or unreasonable tolls are all possible factors influence the user experience.
Therefore, both spending and experience on infrastructure would alter the
public perception of government’s competence and performance and hence af-
fect the acceptance, support or satisfactory rates of incumbent officers. There-
fore, it will inturn influence the behavior of the officer who makes the decision.
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The impact of voting mechanism on infrastructure decisions is widely studied
in political economics ([24]) but is not emphasized in study of cost overrun.
The interactions, i.e. procurement, tax, voting, utilization, between govern-
ment, public and infrastructure is shown in Figure 2.1.
Government
Public infrastructure
Acceptance
Rate Tax Procurement
Figure 2.1: Modeling framework
As we emphasize in 2.1, existing literature in this field tries to dissect the
whole problem and disentangle the interaction between government, the public
and infrastructure. At best, only part of them are considered under the same
context. Nevertheless, incorporating all the factors and the interactions in one
single model would facilitate the researchers, practitioners and policy makers
to achieve the following advantages:
1. Broader vision: As the factors that would cause cost overrun include
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technical issue, economic motivation, political and institutional imperfec-
tion and psychological opportunism and optimism, the analysis of cost
overrun should incorporate everything under one framework rather than
study them individually.
2. More concrete result: Even with the descriptive and qualitative model,
identifying the role played by each factor in inducing cost overrun is still
impossible. Building a comprehensive model enables us to overcome this
obstacle by quantitatively analyzing the effects and identifying the prior-
ity in tackling cost overrun problems.
3. More systematic policy: Based on 1. and 2., the framework provides a
systematic solution to cost overrun to best address all aspects of issues.
This could only be realized through counting the motivation of all players
and effects of all interactions.
Two stages: decision and realization stage
In public infrastructure procurement involving uncertainties, there are two
stages: decision stage and realization stage. In decision stage, the informa-
tion about the uncertainty, for example the distribution of the construction and
maintenance cost, is revealed to the decision maker(government agent). Notice
that such information is usually not available to public and the federal govern-
ment. Then the government agent works out plan and design on the infrastruc-
ture. Such design have to be forged with the existence of uncertainty. Possess-
ing the ability to perfectly manage risk, (for example, better prediction of cost,
fast reaction to volatility of commodity market, etc.) decision maker ideally can
make contingent plans on different scenarios. Nevertheless, such assumption is
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over simplified that usually do not exist in real world projects. Decision maker
without the ability of immediate reaction would rather make a compromising
decision to be applied to all scenarios. The result of the compromising decision
is loss of social welfare, but such trade-off is reasonable and common measures
in risk management.
After the decision being made and the building work starting, the uncertain-
ties are resolved. The real value of uncertainty could be either larger or smaller
than the estimated one. Also, as the design decision was made based on es-
timation ex ante, the best decision ex post could be different from the ex ante
one. Therefore, there will be extra unused capacity due to optimistic ex ante
design, or under-served demand because of conservative decision. As all the
investment in infrastructure is sunk, scale back capacity is usually not a possible
choice, but scale up capacity, i.e. make additional construction is still feasible.
Figure 2.2 shows the structure of this two-stage model.
The modeling framework introduced above is applicable to various types of
infrastructure management projects. Transportation infrastructure, specifically
highway infrastructure project is used as an example. In the following section,
the network, transportation, agent and voting models are introduced.
2.2.2 Underlying models
A transportation infrastructure could be a highway, railroad, tunnel or bridge.
Therefore, plenty of models could be involved in the decision process of in-
frastructure projects, such as facility/network design, building/maintenance
cost evaluation, route choice/traffic assignment, highway pricing, environmen-
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1.Government officer gets private informa-
tion on distribution of uncertainty.
2.Government officer makes decisions on
design of infrastructure.
3.Infrastructure is built and uncertainty re-
solves.
4.Under-supplied demand is revealed and
additional construction work is done.
Decision stage
Realization stage
Figure 2.2: Two-stage model
tal impact, multi-modal traffic, etc. Each of them is intensively studied in a
wide range of literature and the theories are backed up by models with differ-
ent complexity and accuracy. As we are considering a theoretical framework
and trying to shed lights on infrastructure management in a general manor, we
try to achieve an optimal trade-off between complexity and accuracy to reveal
essence of the problem with least complexity in structure and solution and cover
as many aspects of the problem as possible.
Network
A network with a newly constructed highway could be represented by a 3-zone
network, which is shown in Figure 2.3. There is a highway connecting city S
and B. Also, two local roads which are supposed to have less capacity and lower
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speed limit are connecting I-S and I-B. Without loss of generality, assume that
the officer of this jurisdiction is considering building a highway (larger capacity
and higher speed limit compared to local road) connecting I to B.
I
S
B
Figure 2.3: 3-node-3-link network
Let d denotes the design of the new highway. d could be either a scalar
or a vector containing several decision factors, such as route, length, number
of lanes, demand (traffic flow), etc. Also, there will be demand between each
origin-destination (O-D) pair.
Besides demand, let q denote the flow on the link, q0IS , q
0
IB and q
0
S B denote
the original flow between I-S, I-B and S-B, respectively and similar for ex post
flows qIS , qIB and qS B. The flow in the opposite direction is defined similarly.
User equilibrium assumes that all the users on the network could not improve
there utility, that is, travel cost of an individual is not decreasing by changing
different route.
The travel time is determined by Bureau of Public Roads(BPR) model which
is
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τ = λ0
1 + β1 ( q(d)Cap(d)
)β2
where λ0 is the designed free flow travel time on the highway, β1 and β2 are
parameters determined by the highway character, Cap(d) is the capacity of the
link. Assume that
Capi(d) =

d, i ∈ {IB}
Capi, i ∈ {IS , S B}.
Thus the existing traffic flow on the highway could be determined by traffic
assignment algorithm.
Social benefit and cost
The cost of building and maintaining the infrastructure is uncertain from gov-
ernment officer’s perspective. This could due to lack of expertise of managing
inventory, hedging risk, etc. Thus the cost could be denoted as cξ, where ξ is a
random variable with density function fc(·) and cumulative distribution func-
tion Fc(·). We assume that the distribution of such uncertainty is only known to
the government officer, but realization can be observed by everybody (govern-
ment officer, public or central government).
Benefit of building a highway between I and B comes from the improvement
of travel time on the network. The improvement of travel time on link l is cal-
culated as
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∆Ul(d) = q0l τ
0
l − ql(d)τl(d) (2.1)
where d is the design decision variable, q0l and ql denote the flow before and
after highway construction, respectively, and τ0l and τl denote the travel time
before and after highway construction, respectively
Heterogeneity
As we discussed, factors such as spending (cost) and improvement of traffic
(benefit) in highway projects will have uneven impact on local residents. Fur-
thermore, indirect utility will also influence the public perception of the gov-
ernment. Indirect utility may include all kinds of spill-over effect brought by
the new infrastructure. For example, new highway would help growth of local
economy, but would also have negative effects such as noise and air pollution.
Let σ denote the net indirect utility of each household or individual. Then
the government officer’s decision brings indirect benefit to the household or
individual if σ > 0, and cost if σ < 0. Furthermore, assume that the indirect
utilities of residents is randomly distributed according to cumulative distribu-
tion function F(σ) (and corresponding density function is f (σ)). Without loss
of generality, we assume that the expectation of x is zero. Thus, the number of
people with utility larger than σ0 is 1 − F(σ0).
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Decision making
Given a network and a link connecting two points to be built, decision variable
d is decided given various constraints. Then the formulation is:
max
d
BENEFIT(d, c) − COST(d, c) (2.2)
s.t. CONSTRAINTS(d, c) 6 0, (2.3)
(2.2) and (2.3) indicates that the decision maker’s objective is to maximizes
the benefit from the design and minimizes the cost by choosing d satisfying
all the given constraints. Notice that the BENEFIT(d, c) and COST(d, c) are not
necessarily the social benefit or cost, but could be the benefit and cost to the
decision maker.
2.3 Cost overrun
In this section we will discuss the formation of cost overrun and the root driving
cause. We confine our discussion scope in the situation where uncertainties are
involved in projects’ decision processes and government officer has information
advantage compared with the public and central government. The advantage
comes from the officers possessing the knowledge about the distribution of the
random variable. The public, third party or central government only knows the
possible range of the value of the uncertainty. Therefore it is difficult to assert
ex ante whether a decision about the infrastructure is proper or not. Even there
is ex post cost overrun, it is impossible to simply conclude that the decision is
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originally biased.
With uncertainty in building and operating cost, cost overrun is inevitable.
Therefore cost overrun could be classified in two categories by the pattern of
how real cost exceeding estimated cost. In one way, the estimated cost is smaller
than the real cost. This could due to higher-than-expected material, financing or
management costs, delay due to natural or political issues, etc. After the project
is completed, the infrastructure is built, operated and maintained according to
original design. We refer to this type of cost overrun as ex-ante cost overrun
Another form of cost overrun goes into entirely opposite way and is even
ignored by literature in cost overrun literature ([18]). In this category, the esti-
mated cost is higher than the real one. Although such conservative estimation
could avoid ex-ante cost overrun, interestingly, there will be extra demand dis-
covered ex post. For example, the real cost of building an extra exit on a high-
way is much lower than the estimated cost, which makes the addition of a new
exit become economical, or after a deadly derailing accident occurs, installing
speed control system on railroad is urgent while such demand is not address ex
ante due to high installation fee of such system ([52]). Given the extra demand,
the contract scope will be changed and new work will be done. Although the
ex ante cost estimation is higher than the ex post one (which seems to be cost
‘underrun’), after additional work, the design is changed and the final cost will
still exceeds the estimated one. This type of cost overrun is referred as ex-post
cost overrun.
In this section, we first review how ex-ante and ex-post cost overrun is de-
rived from government’s decision making process. Then we will compare the
results and explain the root cause of cost overrun problem.
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2.3.1 Benevolent government officer with expertise
We first consider when the government officer possesses all kinds of technical
know-hows and makes decision to maximize the total social welfare. The result
in this section will serve as a benchmark in the following analysis.
Let ξ denotes the uncertainties in cost. Then the objective function of the
decision maker thus becomes:
S 0ξ(d) =
∑
i
∆Ui(d) − Γ(d, cξ), ∀ξ (2.4)
The benevolent government officer will maximize the total social welfare.
Also, with expertise in managing the uncertainty in cost, she could maximize
this under any circumstances. Under this condition, she actually maximizes
(2.4), which is,
(P0) max
d
S 0ξ(d) ∀ξ (2.5)
To solve problem (2.5), we could get the first order condition of it:
∑
i
∂∆U i(d)
∂d
− ∂Γ(d, cξ)
∂d
= 0 (2.6)
The root of equation (2.6), d0ξ ∀ξ, will serve as the benchmark in the following
analysis. Notice that the subscript ξ indicates that the design is always optimal
regardless of the realization of the randomness.
Therefore, in this case, the government officer can offer a ‘menu’ of decision
contingent on possible costs and the infrastructure will be optimally built given
the realization of uncertainty.
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2.3.2 Benevolent government officer without expertise
Although the social welfare will be maximized in each scenario if the govern-
ment officer has the ability to manage uncertainty, it is almost always the case
that she is unable to effectively deal with the uncertainty, and only second-best
outcome is available.
The objective function of government officer becomes,
S 1(d) = Eξ
∑
i
∆Ui(d) − Γ(d, cξ)
 (2.7)
Notice that in (2.4), for each scenario, i.e. possible realization of ξ, there is
one objective function. On contrary, in (2.7), there is only one objective function
specifying solution to all scenarios. This makes that decision coarser and less
socially favorable than the one in (2.4).
The optimization problem and its first order condition becomes:
(P1) max
d
S 1(d)
Eξ
∑
i
∂∆U i(d)
∂d
− ∂Γ(d, cξ)
∂d
 = 0 (2.8)
Let d1 denote the root of (2.8). Notice that this decision comes from the ex-
pectation of uncertainty. Define c0(d) as
d = argmax
d
∑
i
∆Ui(d) − Γ(d, c0(d))
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That is c(d) is the cost that makes decision variable d become optimal in 2.5.
Accordingly, define d0(c) = (c0)−1(c), that is, the optimal design in 2.5 when cost
is c. Therefore, after the uncertainty being resolved in the future, e.g. the cost is
cξ0 , we will have d1 > d(cξ0) if c0(d1) < cξ0 and d1 < d(cξ0) if c0(d1) > cξ0 , that is, if
the real cost is higher than the estimated one, the design will be larger than the
optimal one and vice versa.
From the analysis above and (2.8) we know that
S 1(d1) = EξS 0ξ(d
1) < S 0ξ(d
0) (2.9)
Inequality (2.9) indicates that under the condition that the uncertainty could
not be well-managed, the final decision will get lower social welfare than the
ideal case. Moreover, the final design d1 won’t be optimal in most scenarios.
Such sub-optimality comes from that the government officer could not opti-
mally forecast the future uncertainty. Thus under some realization of uncer-
tainty, the final design will be less than the optimal one and for other scenarios,
the final design will be larger than the optimal one.
In this case, the government officer should announce an estimated cost c0(d1)
which based on the optimal solution, d1, of the optimization problem (P1). The
infrastructure is built based on this second-best decision, d1, and there will be
social welfare loss.
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2.3.3 Selfish government officer without expertise
In 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we assume that the government officer is benevolent, that is,
she will always maximize the social welfare. However, it is widely accepted
that in the infrastructure project decision process, political issues have a greater
influence on the proposal.([33]) A government officer with objective other than
social welfare is referred as selfish and the decision from her may not be socially
optimal.
There are several motivations for government agent to be selfish: Firstly,
with more people support the proposal, the more likely the project will be im-
plemented. Studies in transportation infrastructure management have pointed
out the significance of such incentive ([23]). The second motivation is reelection.
Transportation projects are usually regarded as a positive mark of good perfor-
mance of government officers. Thus incumbent officers usually use highway
projects as political capital to gain more intermediate voters in future election,
or as a way to directly ‘buy votes’.1 Thus, the objective function of officer’s is
different from (2.5) or (2.3.2) in the way that, the officer is not pursuing total
social benefit, but the total weighted social benefit by popularity.
After the highway being built, each household or individual’s utility func-
tion will be changed by three factors we mentioned in 2.2: spending, change
in traveling utility and indirect utility from the highway. Therefore the utility
function of a household or individual in group i could be expressed as,
1One prominent case is pork-barrel politics in infrastructure investment.[66]
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S 2i (d, α) =Eξ
 1δi∆U i(d) − α∑
k∈A
δk
Γ(d, cξ) + σi
 , i ∈ A (2.10)
where ∆U i(·) is the travel cost improvement of group i, Γ(d, c) is the spending
on the infrastructure including building, operating and maintaining cost, and σi
is a random parameter of externality, that is the utility gain or loss beyond the
spending and travel time improvement, such as expansion of local business,
increasing of job market, or deteriorating of air/noise condition. The coefficient
α denotes the local awareness of the possible future tax increase. If the local
residents is totally aware and concerned on the spending, α = 1 and if the local
residents treats the highway as free, then α = 0.
Thus, the utility of each group residents is the gain or loss from the sum of
travel time improvement, cost per capita through taxation and the externality
brought by the infrastructure. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of σi
is F(σi) and probability distribution function (PDF) is f (σi), which means that
the number of people with random externality σi in group i is F(σi). Without
loss of generality, we assume that Eσi = 0, that is the indirect effect on local
residential group is zero. This simplification does not influence our conclusion
and will come back to this point later. Then the portion of people in group i
having positive utility after the infrastructure project is built becomes
δi
(
1 − F
(
S f ixi (d, α)
))
, S f ixi (d, α) =
α∑
k∈A
δk
Γ(d, cEξ) − 1
δi
∆U i(d) , i ∈ A (2.11)
All S f ixi (d, α) are the fixed (dis)utility functions of group i and we have
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−
∑
i
δiS f ixi (d, α) is actually the total net social benefit of the infrastructure
project.
The officer is trying to maximize the total number of people having positive
utility after implementation, that is:
(P2) max
d
S 2(d, α) = max
d
∑
i ∈A
δi
1 − F
 α∑
k∈A
δk
Γ(d, cEξ) − 1
δi
∆U i(d)

 (2.12)
The first-order condition of (2.12) is
−
∑
i
δi f (S f ixi (d, α))
∂S f ixi (d, α)
∂d
= 0 (2.13)
The first-order condition (2.13) resembles its counterpart in previous sections
2.3.1 and 2.3.2 in the way that, it is actually a weighted average of the derivative
of benefit and cost. The weights are determined by f (S f ixi (d, α)), the density of
indifferent population of group i.
As S f ixi (d, α) denotes the disutility of group i and f (·) is a probability distri-
bution function (pdf), the term f (S f ixi (d, α)) then becomes the density of house-
holds or individual who are indifferent in building the highway. In other word,
it is the fraction of people who will vote for (against) the project in group i if the
mean disutility decreases (increases) by one unit. Then the product δi f (S if ix(d, x))
is the number of people who are current indifferent on the project’s implemen-
tation.
If first-order condition holds, the government officer would not be willing to
change the design, and hence change the disutility function of each group when
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the change in total number of indifferent population is not positive, that is, she
will lose support.
If the indirect utility of household is uniformly distributed, which is defined
as follows:
f (x) =
1
S H − S L = Const x ∈ [S L, S H]
Then we have the density of indifferent population remains the same in the
interval [S L, S H]. The first-order condition (2.13) becomes∑
i
δi(Const)
∂S f ixi (d, α)
∂d
= 0 (2.14)
Therefore, the solution to equation (2.14) is identical to the solution of (2.8), that
is, when the government officer is benevolent. Thus, when the utility of resi-
dents in each group is uniformly distributed or at least the selfish agent believes
so, the final decision made by her should be same as the the benevolent officer.
In this case the weighted sum of derivatives coincides the first-order condition
of social welfare.
When the distribution f is not uniform, we should expect that different util-
ity function of individuals will induce different decision outcome. As we are
interested in the final decision d2’s relationship with the second-best decision
d1, we can examine the value of left-hand side (LHS ) of first-order condition,
(2.13), at the point d1. If for (2.13), LHS > 0 at d1, we know that d2 > d1 and vice
versa. Therefore we discuss the effect of different degree of awareness of spend-
ing, α on the LHS of (2.13). We refer to the case when d2 > d1 as under-estimated
decision because the cost is under-estimated ex ante (c0(d2) < c0(d1)) and the case
d2 < d1 as under-designed decision as the design decision d2 is smaller than the
benevolent one.
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Residents have no awareness of spending, α = 0
α = 0 indicates that local residents treat the newly built infrastructure as to-
tal ‘free’. This could due to that the government officer intentionally hide the
spending information of highway from the public or the major or entire spend-
ing is covered by federal fund outside jurisdiction. In such situation, the utility
function of each individual in region i, equation (2.10), becomes
S 2i (d, 0) =Eξ
[
1
δi
∆U i(d) + σi
]
, i ∈ A
and the disutility of each individual in group i becomes,
S f ixi (d, 0) = −
1
δi
∆U i(d) , i ∈ A
Therefore, the first order condition, (2.13), becomes
−
∑
i∈A
f
(
− 1
δi
∆U i(d)
) (
−∂∆U
i(d)
∂d
)
= 0 (2.15)
As f (·) is density function, f (·) > 0. Then we can divide (2.15) by∑
i∈A
f
(
− 1
δi
∆U i(d)
)
and get
∑
i∈A
f i0
∂∆U i(d)
∂d
= 0 (2.16)
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where
f i0 =
f
(
− 1
δi
∆U i(d)
)
∑
i∈A
f
(
− 1
δi
∆U i(d)
) , i ∈ A
f i0 is actually a coefficient that
∑
i∈A f i0 = 1. One immediate observation is that,
smaller ∆U i(d) or larger δi produce larger f i0 and the final decision d
2 will have
more weight on group i.
After the highway being built, as there is no extra demand in the network
and the travel time of link I-S and S-B are fixed, there are two different scenar-
ios: The travelers between I-S choose only link I-S or choose the links I-B-S2,
as shown in Figure 2.4. Then the groups that are affected by the newly built
highway are i ∈ {IB, IS }. Hence, (2.16) becomes
∑
i∈A
f i0
∂∆U i(d)
∂d
= 0, , i ∈ {IB, IS } (2.17)
As
∂∆U i(d)
∂d
> 0 for all d (otherwise the newly built highway is not socially
beneficial), we know that LHS > 0 for (2.17) at d1 and d2 > d1. Actually, we could
further get d2 → ∞. Therefore, in this case, when local residents are not concern
with spending (α = 0) and the newly built highway does not have externailities
on people other than travelers between I-B, the government officer will claim
low cost c0(d2) and make high decision d2 based on this low cost. There will be
no change of scope ex post. In other words, there will be cost overrun entirely
induced by under-estimated decisions.
From the above analysis, if the newly built highway does not have visible
2If the travel time on link I-S and S-B are not fixed, there will be a third scenario where
travelers between I-S will choose I-S and I-B-S simultaneously. This is a case that the newly
built link generate negative externality on other groups of residents, which is a case falls in the
discussion of later sections.
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Figure 2.4: Left: Travelers between I-S use link I-S. Right: Newly built highway
I-B does not change route choices
negative externality on other group (in our example, it is group of travelers
between S-B), the government officer will report an lower cost c(d2) < c(d1) than
benevolent case and we will get under-estimated decisions.
Residents have full awareness of spending, α = 1
When α = 1, the residents are fully aware of the spending on the new highway.
As the fund on transportation infrastructure usually comes from local gas tax,
building a new highway could be treated as a negative externality to people
who are not direct benefit from it but still need to pay tax on it. Therefore, when
α = 1, the government officer is making decision under the situation that there
are negative externality on part of local residents.
Therefore, we have the first-order condition (2.13) becomes
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∑
i∈A
f i1
∂∆U
i(d)
∂d
− δ
i∑
k∈A
δk
∂Γ(d, cEξ)
∂d
 = 0 (2.18)
where
f i1 =
f
− 1δi∆U i(d) + 1∑
k∈A
δk
Γ(d, cEξ)

∑
i∈A
f
− 1δi∆U i(d) + 1∑
k∈A
δk
Γ(d, cEξ)

.
f i1 is equivalent to the ‘weight’ of the items in the first order condition. Same
to previous section, we will examine the value of LHS of 2.18 at d1.
Notice that the first-order condition for the case benevolent officer without
expertise, 2.8, is a special case of 2.18 when f i1 = f
j
1 , ∀ i, j ∈ A. Therefore, if the
net benefit of each individual in the jurisdiction is the same, the decision made
by selfish officer is coincident with the decision made by benevolent officer.
However, this is usually not the case given that the newly built highway
is socially beneficial. Without loss of generality, we assume that the group of
travelers between I − S using only the link I − S , that is there is no positive
utility change from the highway. Recall that the average utility of individual in
each group i is S if ix. As the social welfare is the sum of utility of each group of
people, i.e.
Social welfare = δIBS IBf ix + δ
ISS ISf ix + δ
S BS S Bf ix > 0,
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utility of group IB is positive, S IBf ix > 0, and utilities of groups SB and IS are
negative S S Bf ix, S
IS
f ix < 0, we have δ
IBS IBf ix + δ
ISS ISf ix > 0 and δ
IBS IBf ix + δ
S BS S Bf ix > 0.
When
S IBf ix > f
−1
(
1
2
[ f (S ISf ix) + f (S
S B
f ix)]
)
, (2.19)
we have the decision from selfish government officer, d2 is less than the
benevolent decision d1. (2.19) indicates that if the utility of individuals who
directly benefit from the highway is large, the selfish decision will fall short of
the social optimal one as it tries to mitigate the negative externality to groups
I-S and S-B.
2.3.4 Summary
From the above analysis, when government agent is selfish, the perception of
spending (negative externality) plays a key role in the final decisions. If the pub-
lic only focuses on the utility they can get from the highway, the final decision
d2 will be entirely under-estimated, that is the government agent will report low
cost and propose high design. On the other hand, if the public focuses both on
utility and cost of the highway, the result will most likely to be under-designed.
The different values of αwill induce various degree of under-estimated decision
and under-designed decision.
It is interesting that for the benevolent officer without expertise, the decision
d1 will also induce cost overrun. When the estimated cost c0(d1) is less than the
real cost cξ, d1 is larger than the socially optimal design d0ξ and the estimated cost
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will exceed real cost (ex ante cost overrun). It is also possible that c0(d1) > cξ, that
is, the design is less than the optimal design d0ξ . This indicates that the design is
not sufficient ex ante and extra work will be done ex post to serve extra demand
(ex post cost overrun).
Although d1 will also cause cost overrun problem, there are two differences
between d1 and d2. Firstly, from the definition of (2.7), although d1 is not socially
optimal, it actually minimizes the expected cost overrun. However, there is no
guarantee that d2 has the same effect (although some d2 will coincidentally same
as d1). Secondly, in the cost overrun problem induced by d1, two categories of
cost overrun, ex ante cost overrun and ex post cost overrun, happen with same
significance. However in the possible outcomes induced by d2, there will be
either more ex ante cost overrun caused by under-estimated decision or ex post
overrun by under-designed problem.
Given that decision d2 is not socially favorable, it is attractive for federal gov-
ernment and the public to regulate the government officer from making such
decision. However, as such decision is enabled by the private information pos-
sessed by the officer, it is not trivial to prevent the unfavorable results. In the
following section, we investigate the possibility to extract officer’s private infor-
mation on cost using auditing.
2.4 Auditing project costs
If there is a benevolent federal government who desires socially optimal deci-
sion d1 and can exert influence on local residents within the selfish government
officer’s jurisdiction, the federal government can design an auditing mechanism
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that given the selfish government officer’s decision d and corresponding cost es-
timation c = c0(d),
• The federal government audits the jurisdiction with probability p(c),
• due to technical issue, the audit will successfully reveal real cost estima-
tion c¯ with only probability θ,
• if government officer does not honestly report the estimated cost c¯, she
will be punished by piM(c, c¯), where M(c, c¯) is the measure of difference
between real cost and reported cost,
• cost of auditing is k, which is fixed,
• assume that the central government will always commit to the mecha-
nism.
Auditing is considered as an solution to cost overrun problem ([34]). How-
ever, existing literature on audit ([61]) only consider the situation when project
cost is paid by the agent subjected to auditing and the punishment for being dis-
honest is a monetary transfer. In the context of our model, it is the public who
pays for the infrastructure and the government agent’s utility is population of
supporters of infrastructure. Therefore, we would expect two changes in our
model. Firstly, the punishment is not a direct monetary transfer. Secondly, the
available punishment may not be strong enough to make government officer
truth-telling.
Therefore, the auditing problem is:
45
(A)
max
p(c∗)
Ec∗
[∑
i ∆Ui(c−1(c∗)) − Γ(c−1(c∗), c∗) − kp(c∗)
]
s.t. c∗ = argmaxc S
2(c−1(c), α) − p(c)θpiM(c, c¯)
(2.20)
where S 2 is objective function of selfish officer,
S 2(d, α) =
∑
i ∈A
δi
1 − F
 α∑
k∈A
δk
Γ(d, cEξ) − 1
δi
∆U i(d)

 .
We first consider that situation when the central government can exert arbi-
trary influence on government officer, i.e. pi ∈ [0,∞). Then we have
M(c, c¯) =
1
m
S 1(c−1(c)) − S 2(c−1(c), α∗), (2.21)
where c−1(c), which yields the corresponding design variable of cost level c,
is the inverse function of c(d), α∗ makes c−1(c) the optimal solution of S 2(d, α∗)
and m is the monetary value of one voter to the selfish government officer. The
first term in equation (2.21) is the equivalent utility for government officer if
she is maximizing social welfare and the second term is the real utility of the
officer. Then the measurement is the difference between utility of benevolent
officer (translated into voting number) and selfish officer. Therefore, we achieve
that the optimal auditing policy is (for proof, refer to [64])
p(c) =
1
θpi
∈ (0, 1) (2.22)
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In summary, the central government should select a punishment piM(c, c¯),
such that
1
θpi
∈ (0, 1) and can achieve second-best decision outcome d1.
When the central government’s ability is limited, e.g. the central govern-
ment can only affect part of the population δ after revealing the biased design
of selfish government officer, that is piM(c, c¯) 6 δ. From the above result, when
1
θpi
> 1, even auditing can not guarantee the desired decision d1. Then we have
M(c, c¯) > θδ (2.23)
This indicates that, when the central government could not influence more
local residents than the officer could gain by making selfish decision, the opti-
mal audit mechanism could not ensure best outcome d1.
2.5 Generalization to cost overrun in all infrastructure system
In this chapter, although our study focuses on a 3-node transportation network,
the result could be easily generalized to the study of cost overrun in all infras-
tructure system with possibility of spatial externality. Let ∆U i denote the posi-
tive utility group i get from the infrastructure and Γi denote the negative utility
group i get (Notice that ∆U i and Γi in previous sections are travel time improve-
ment and spending respectively). In the system, there are multiple groups of
residents, users, etc., i ∈ A. We also use S 0ξ , S 1, and S 2 to denote the objective
function of benevolent government officer with expertise, benevolent govern-
ment officer without expertise, and selfish government officer without exper-
tise, respectively and d0ξ , d
1 and d2 are corresponding final decision.
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Therefore from the result in previous sections, when the distribution of util-
ity of different group is identical normal distribution, the decision d1 and d2 are
the same. When there are no negative externalities, i.e. Γi = 0, ∀ i ∈ A, we have
d2 > d1. In this case, there will be mainly under-estimated decisions.
In section 2.3.3, we assume that ∆US B > 0 simplified the discussion. This
assumption can be claimed as ‘without loss of generality’ because when ∆US B <
0, we can define
Γ¯S B = −∆US B
∆U¯S B = 0
this is equivalent to that the group S-B has an extra spending on the highway
and the change of traveling utility is 0.
On the other hand, when Γi > 0, i.e. there is negative externality from the
infrastructure, the final decision d2 depends on average utility S if ix of each group
i. If the groups gaining utilities has less population or more utility increase, the
final decision d2 < d1 and vice versa.
Therefore, in cost overrun problem, the scenarios that decision is under-
estimated dominates. This explain the the cost overrun is usually discovered
as estimated cost exceeding real cost, that is ex-ante cost overrun. The ex-post
cost overrun, caused by under-designed decision, usually requires change of
contract scope.
The model could also provide deeper insights in infrastructure project. For
example, it is sometimes appealing that bundling a group of infrastructure
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projects in one jurisdiction to ensure each group benefit from the bundling of
projects and negative externalities are compensated. However, from our anal-
ysis, in this way, the cost overrun is still not mitigated because all the groups
have positive utility and there will be under-estimated decision and hence ex-
ante cost overrun.
2.6 Main Findings
In this chapter, we model the cost overrun problem under an infrastructure net-
work context and identify the quantitative and qualitative signs of political and
economic drivers. We consider a local government building an infrastructure
within an existing infrastructure system with heterogeneous users and different
groups enjoy different benefits from the newly built infrastructure. The cost of
the infrastructure is uncertain. The government officer, who is decision maker,
knows the distribution of such uncertainty privately but could not predict the
exact realization. Therefore, she can only make a ‘rough’ decision given the dis-
tribution and cost overrun is a possible outcome. We assume that there are two
types of officers, benevolent and selfish ones, where benevolent government of-
ficer will make decision to maximize the social welfare while the selfish one will
maximize her own benefit. As the public and higher level government don’t
know the distribution ex ante, it is impossible to tell the government officer’s
type purely from the decision she made and the corresponding result (whether
or not cost overrun).
In line with other literature in infrastructure management such as [5], the in-
frastructure project consists of two stages: decision stage and realization stage.
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In the decision stage, the distribution of the uncertainty is revealed to govern-
ment officer who will estimate cost and make decision. In the realization stage,
infrastructure is built and the uncertainty will be resolved. The cost immedi-
ately following resolution of uncertainty is referred as intermediate cost, while
the cost following completion of the whole project is called real cost.
We classify the cost overrun into ex-ante cost overrun and ex-post cost over-
run. Ex-ante cost overrun is induced by optimistic cost estimation where, the
estimated cost is lower than the intermediate cost immediately after the reso-
lution of uncertainty. In the contrast, ex-post cost overrun is mainly caused by
change of scope where the estimated cost is higher than the intermediate cost
but lower than the real cost because of extra work after the resolution of uncer-
tainty. We identify that the decision made by benevolent officer will induce both
cost overrun with same significance. However, decision from selfish officer will
favor one kind of cost overrun.
The main finding of this chapter is, in real world project, in examination of
causes of cost overrun, the cost overrun induced by optimistic forecast of cost
should be distinguished from change of scope. If the ex-ante or ex-post cost
overrun dominates, it is a strong sign of existence of selfish driver behind the
cost overrun. Among existing empirical studies, in [58], the authors’ findings
suggest that for a single transportation project, the cost overrun is either purely
induced by poor estimation or by extension and [57] reported that major rea-
son for time and cost overruns is inadequate funding of project. These findings
are signs indicating that cost overruns are not purely driven by technical uncer-
tainty.
Through this model, we explain the prevalence of cost overrun discovered
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in empirical study such as [35]. Although statistical data depicts cost overrun as
dominating, our model indicates that this is reasonable according to the defini-
tion and irreversible investment. Irreversible investment prevents scaling-down
ex post but permits scaling-up. Therefore there will be a tendency to have more
cost overruns.
As it is suggested by [16], auditing could be an effective measure to pre-
vent cost overrun. We also study the effectiveness of auditing mechanism of
a benevolent central or federal government to randomly audit the real cost of
project and punish the lying government officer. We discover that the effective-
ness of auditing largely depends on the ability of central government to conduct
successful audit and exert enough influence on local taxpayers and voters. With
only limited ability in influencing residents, auditing is ineffective in correcting
cost overrun. [61] introduced an auditing mechanism for cost overrun claims.
The government will always audit the claim above a cut-off value and never for
the one below the threshold. Their model discovered that most firms will claim
cost overrun for the value precisely below threshold, which is supported by
empirical observation. This chapter takes one step further to discuss the effec-
tiveness of auditing mechanism to prevent the selfish government officer from
making biased decision.
51
CHAPTER 3
CORRUPTION AND POST-TENDER PHASE RENEGOTIATION
3.1 Introduction
Public-Private Partnership, where governments and private companies collab-
orate to provide public infrastructure or service and share revenue, cost and
risk, is widely applied in all spheres of economic activities such as transport,
power grid, water supply, waste, IT, etc.1 PPP may exist in different forms,
such as “Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) and “Build-Own-Operate” (BOO). The
advantages of PPP in procuring public infrastructure and service include bet-
ter economic indicator, technological innovation, proper risk sharing and less
constrained government budget.
In this chapter, we discuss the corruption in post-tender phase renegotiation
of a PPP project. In our model, a new highway is built as an alternative of
an existing local road. After the contract is awarded, uncertain factors realize
and a potential government-led renegotiation could be Pareto-improving for the
society. However, due to administration cost, the central or local government
can not directly renegotiate the contract and therefore delegate the decision to a
local official. The official can be selfish, which means that she can collude with
either the local residents group or the contractor of the project, or both, in the
process of renegotiation to seek illicit personal benefit.2 The official can decide
whether to initiate the renegotiation or not based on her information and then
the residents group and the contractor can either accept or decline the offer. If
1For a complete review of PPP performance, refer to [44]
2To avoid confusion, we refer to the official with feminine form (she), local residents and
contractor with masculine form (he) and the central government with plural form (they).
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the offer is decline by either of the party, the original design is implemented
otherwise, the new design is developed based on central government’s rule.
3.2 The model
In this chapter we consider the renegotiation game in post-tender session in a
highway project. The central or state government is building a new highway be-
tween point A and B where there is already an existing highway with a constant
travel time tA. The design of the new highway is a pair (p,C) with p denoting
the toll price and C the capacity. Let the travel time of newly built highway
being t(q,C) where q denotes the traffic flow using the highway. Based on user
equilibrium, we must have
tA = t(q,C) − p
β
where β denotes the smallest value of time (VOT) of travelers on the newly
built highway. Furthermore, the cost of building the highway is kC, where k is
the cost of one unit of capacity.
The group of residents currently traveling between A and B is denoted as
R. we assume that the total demand between A and B does not change after
the new highway being built. The residents have heterogeneous VOTs which
distribute according to a cumulative density function (CDF) F(β, θ), where θ is
the parameter of the distribution.
Following the definition and derivation in [69], let γ =
q
C
denote the volume-
to-capacity (v/c) ratio. According to Tan and Yang (2012), the decision problem
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of (p,C) is equivalent to a decision problem of (β, γ) with p = (tA − t(γ))β and
C = QF¯(β, θ)/γ, where F¯(·) = 1−F(·). [69] derives the social optimal design under
similar settings. To keep this chapter succinct, we only refer to their results
when needed and avoid reinvent the wheel.
3.2.1 Stakeholders
Although infrastructure projects are under the regulation of central or state gov-
ernments, the decision is most likely delegated to local officials as discussed in
([48]). Then, the officials coordinate with contractors selected through tender-
ing process to work out the design of the highway. The interactions between
these two parties in pre-tender and tender phases are usually regulated by laws
and closely monitored by government or third party agents. However, in the
post-tender phase, as mentioned in Section 3.1, the local official and contractor
have more freedom in renegotiation. Therefore, the post-tender phase of infras-
tructure projects is prone to corruption and collusion ([48]).
The contractors, as private companies, will attempt to maximize their own
profit by increasing revenue or saving cost through contract renegotiation. To
achieve this, they will be willing to share the extra profit with the official who
facilitates this. On the other hand, the officials would be interested in both the
bribe, which is in the form of personal benefit, political donation, or political
capital provided by local residents such as the chances of being reelected. The
local residents could also participate in the collusion to minimize their payment
(toll and tax) and/or maximize the transportation benefit from the highway.
Although the local official, the contractor and the residents group are self
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interested, the central (or state) government is regarded as benevolent here in
this framework. When information is symmetric, the central government can
implement social optimal design without any loss. However, under asymmet-
ric information, the local official, contractor and/or residents group can delib-
erately hide the true information from the central government and induce the
outcome unfairly favoring their own benefits.
3.2.2 Information structure
In this model, all the three self-interested parties possess private information.
The parameter of the distribution of VOT, θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] is privately held by resi-
dents group, the unit cost of building highway, k ∈ [k, k¯] is privately known
to the contractor and the local official possesses the information on whether
she knows the private information held by residents group and the contractor,
σ ∈ {(θ, k), ∅}. Let Gθ(·) and Gk(·) denote the cumulative distribution function of θ
and k, respectively and gθ(·) = G′θ(·), gk(·) = G′k(·). The support and distributions
of θ and k are public information. During the pre-tender and tender phases, θ
and k are not realized and the decision of highway is made based on fair esti-
mation θe and ke which are completely audited and free of manipulation by any
party. After the contract is awarded and signed, the θ, k and σ are realized and
privately known to residents group, contractor and official, respectively. If the
design of the highway is renegotiated, the local official must report her infor-
mation about residents group and contractor’ types, σ = ∅ or σ = (θ, k) to the
central government. If the report is no information, σ = ∅, the central govern-
ment will let the residents group and contractor to announce their type, θˆ and
kˆ, respectively. The design thereafter is determined by rule βF(θ, k) and γF(θ, k)
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if local official reports σ = (θ, k) or βN(θˆ, kˆ) and γN(θˆ, kˆ) otherwise. Notice that
neither of the reports is necessarily truthful.
Given the decision rule β and γ, the utility functions of different interest
parties are 3
• Residents group R as a whole is maximizing the sum of the net benefit
from the highway, uR(·) and the subsidies from the government, XR(·), with
the expectation on contractor’s type, k:
UR(θ, θˆ) = uR(θ, θˆ) + XR(θˆ)
where uR(θ, θˆ) = Ek
[
QF¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ)m(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ)(tA − t(γ(θˆ, kˆ)))
]
denotes mone-
tized value of travel time saving from the newly built highway minus the
cost of toll.
• The utility function of contractor is the profit from the newly built high-
way, uc(·) plus the possible subsidies, Xc(·) given the expectation of the
resident’s group type θ:
Uc(k, kˆ) = uc(k, kˆ) + Xc(kˆ) (3.1)
where uc(k, kˆ) = Eθ
[
QF¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ)β(θˆ, kˆ)(tA − t(γ(θˆ, kˆ))) − QF¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ) k
γ(θˆ, kˆ)
]
is the toll revenue from the highway subtracted by the cost of building and
operating the highway.
• Central government: Assume that the central government is benevolent
and maximizing the expected social welfare minus the out-of-pocket pay-
ment to both the residents group and the local contractor.
3The decision rules β and γ will take various forms under different conditions. We will
discuss the optimal decision rule βN , γN , βF and γF short after.
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Ug(θ, k, θˆ, kˆ) = Eθ
[
uR(θ, k, θˆ, kˆ) − XR(θˆ, kˆ)
]
+ Ek
[
uc(θ, k, θˆ, kˆ) − Xc(θˆ, kˆ)
]
(3.2)
3.2.3 Optimal design under different information conditions
Given the information structure and the utility functions, we could derive the
optimal design functions when official is absent and central government pos-
sesses full or no information.
Central government possesses full information
Based on results in mechanism design and information theory (such as [9]), if
the government possesses full information, she does not need to provide mon-
etary transfer and therefore Xc(kˆ) = XR(θˆ) = 0, ∀θˆ, kˆ. Under this condition, the
design of the highway under full information (βF , γF) is determined by the fol-
lowing equations given in Tan and Yang (2012)
βF =
k
γF
[
tA − t(γF)]
m(βF , θ) + βF =
k
(γF)2t′(γF)
(3.3)
To simplify the analysis in the rest of this chapter, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1. The residual VOT m(β, θ) is independent of the design variable β and
decreasing in θ.
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Therefore, we rewrite the function as m(θ). Notice that Assumption 1 holds
when, for example, the distribution of VOT is exponential and if θ is the rate
parameter of the distribution, where f (β) = θe−θβ, then m(β, θ) = m(θ) =
1
θ
.
Following Assumption 1, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The social optimal design under full information (βF , γF) in (3.3) satisfies
the following relationship
γF =
1
βF
e
−
βF
m(θ) , (3.4)
for all γF = γF(θ, k) and βF = βF(θ, k).
Proof. In this proof, the superscription F is omitted for βF and γF .
From the optimal solution 3.3, we know that
t(γ) = tA − k
γβ
(3.5)
Then take derivative of γ on the both sides of Equation (3.5) and we get
t′(γ) =
k
(γβ)2
[
β + γ
∂β
∂γ
]
(3.6)
Substitute t′(γ) in second equation of (3.3) by (3.6) and then we can get
m(θ) + β =
k
γ2
k
(γβ)2
[
β + γ
∂β
∂γ
]
⇒ m(θ) + β = β
2
β + γ
∂β
∂γ
⇒ ∂β
∂γ
= −
(
1
m(θ)
+
1
β
)
1
γ
(3.7)
From (3.7) we know that
γ = exp
(
−
(
β
m(θ)
+ lnβ
))
+ C (3.8)
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For (3.8) we can use the extreme value when γ → +∞ to get C = 0.

Lemma 1 indicates that when central government is provided with full infor-
mation, one design variable v/c ratio, γ, can be determined by another variable,
the threshold value of time (VOT), β. Therefore, in the following sections, we
can focus on single variable when we discuss the renegotiation outcome with
fully informed official. Further, we have the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. Given Assumption 1, βF(θ, k) is monotonously decreasing in θ and k.
γF(θ, k) is monotonously increasing in θ and k.
Proof. Given the result in (3.3), substitute β in the first equation into second one,
we have:
m(θ) +
k
γF
[
tA − t(γF)] = k(γF)2t′(γF)
⇒ m(θ) = k
γF
(
1
γFt′(γF)
− 1
tA − t(γF)
)
(3.9)
As t(γ) and γt′(γ) are increasing in γ for commonly used travel time - v/c ra-
tio model, such as Bureau Public Road (BPR) model, the right-hand-side (RHS)
of (3.9) is decreasing in γ. Also the left-hand-side (LHS) is monotonously de-
creasing in θ, we know that γF is monotonously increasing in θ. Then using
(3.4), it is easy to check that β is decreasing in θ.
On the other hand, fixing θ on the LHS of (3.9), we can see that γ is increasing
in k. Therefore, β is decreasing in k from (3.4).

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Central government possesses no information
If the central government does not possess information about the types of the
residents group and contractor, these two parties can misreport their type and
profit from such behavior. Thus, the central government should provide them
with proper incentive to prevent this. Such incentive is called information rent
in Mechanism Design literature. With a little bit abuse of notation, let UR(θ) =
UR(θ, θ) and Uc(k) = Uc(k, k). The following lemma provides the minimum utility
level the central government should provide the residents group and contractor
to induce truth-telling (superscript ‘N’ denotes local official has no information).
Lemma 3. To ensure both residents group and contractor to be truth-telling when gov-
ernment official has no information, the utility function UNR (θ, θˆ) and U
N
c (k, kˆ) should
satisfy the following conditions:
UNR (θ, k) = Ek
[
UNR (θ¯, k)
]
−
∫ θ¯
θ
Ek
[
Q[tA − t(γ(θ, k))]∂{F¯(β, θ˜)m(θ˜)}
∂θ
]
dθ˜ (3.10)
UNc (θ, k) = Eθ
[
UNc (θ, k¯)
]
−
∫ k¯
k
Eθ
[
QF¯(β(θ, k˜), θ)
1
γ(θ, k)
]
dk˜ (3.11)
where UNR (θ¯) and U
N
c (k¯) is the minimal utility the residents group and contractor can
obtain, respectively, when their types are the highest.
Proof. The utility function of resident is
UNR (θ, θˆ) = Ek
[
QF¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ)m(θ)[tA − t(γ(θˆ, kˆ))] + br(θˆ, kˆ)
]
,
and the utility function of contractor is
UNc (k, kˆ) = Eθ
[
−QF¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ) k
γ(θˆ, kˆ)
+ bc(θˆ, kˆ)
]
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We first derive the result for the resident.
To satisfy incentive compatibility, we have
UNR (θ) > U
N
R (θ, θˆ), ∀ θˆ, θ
We also know that
UNR (θ, θˆ) = U
N
R (θˆ) + Ek
[
Q[tA − t(γ(θˆ, kˆ))][m(θ)F¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ) − m(θˆ)F¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θˆ)]
]
Then we have
UNR (θ) − UNR (θˆ) > Ek
[
Q[tA − t(γ(θˆ, kˆ))][m(θ)F¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ) − m(θˆ)F¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θˆ)]
]
(3.12)
Divided by (θ− θˆ) at both side of inequality (3.12) and get the limit θ → θˆ, we
get
∂UNr (θ)
∂θ
= Ek
Q[tA − t(γ(θˆ, kˆ))]∂
[
m(θˆ)F¯(β0, θ)
]
∂θ
 (3.13)
Integrating (3.13) from θ to θ will give us (3.10).
(3.11) can be proved with the same technique and hence omitted here. 
In mechanism design, constraints (3.10) and (3.11) are referred to as incentive
compatibility constraints. The decision constrained by these equations will in-
duce an outcome that both the residents group and contractor are truth-telling.
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Then, government can determine the design rule of the newly built highway
based on the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The social optimal design (β, γ) when the central government has no infor-
mation should satisfy
(βN , γN) ∈ argmax
β,γ
(uR(θ) + uc(k) − hR(θ) − hc(k)) (3.14)
where
hR(θ) = UNR (θ¯) − Q(tA − t(γ))
[
∂{F¯(β, θ˜)m(θ˜)}
∂θ
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
+ F¯(β, θ)m(θ)}
]
and
hc(k) = UNc (k¯) − QF¯(β, θ)
[
1
γ
(
Gk(k)
gk(k)
− k
)
+ β(tA − t(γ))
]
Proof. Based on (3.10) of Lemma 3, we have the following
Eθ
[
UNR (θ)
]
= Eθ
UNR (θ¯) − ∫ θ¯
θ
Ek
[
Q[tA − t(γ(θ, k))]∂{F¯(β, θ˜)m(θ˜)}
∂θ
]
dθ˜

= UNR (θ¯) −
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
Ek
[
Q[tA − t(γ(θ, k))]∂{F¯(β, θ˜)m(θ˜)}
∂θ
]
dθ˜dGθ(θ)
= UNR (θ¯) −
∫ θ¯
θ
Gθ(θ)Ek
[
Q[tA − t(γ(θ, k))]∂{F¯(β, θ˜)m(θ˜)}
∂θ
]
dθ
= UNR (θ¯) − Eθ,k
[
Q[tA − t(γ(θ, k))]∂{F¯(β, θ˜)m(θ˜)}
∂θ
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
]
(3.15)
In (3.15), we get third line through integrate by part.
Similarly, we can prove that
Ek
[
UNc (k)
]
= UNc (k¯) − Eθ,k
[
QF¯(β(θ, k), θ)
1
γ(θ, k)
Gk(k)
gk(k)
]
(3.16)
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The expected monetary transfers between the central government and the
residents group XR(θ) = UR(θ) − uR(θ) and the one between central government
and contractor is Xc(k) = Uc(k) − uc(k). Therefore, the expectation of XR(θ) and
Xc(k) with respect to θ and k are
Eθ,k[XR(θ)] = Eθ,k
[
UNR (θ¯) − Q(tA − t(γ))
[
∂{F¯(β, θ˜)m(θ˜)}
∂θ
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
+ F¯(β, θ)m(θ)
]]
Eθ,k[Xc(k)] = Eθ,k
[
UNc (k¯) − QF¯(β, θ)
[
1
γ
(
Gk(k)
gk(k)
− k
)
+ β(tA − t(γ))
]]
Therefore, the solution given in (3.14) is locally incentive compatibility. We
still need to prove that it is globally incentive compatibility. This is equivalent
to prove that
UNR (θ) > Ek
[
XR(θ˜) + uR(θ, θ˜)
]
for all θ, θ˜ (3.17)
and
UNc (k) > Eθ
[
Xc(k˜) + uc(k, k˜)
]
(3.18)
(3.17) and (3.18) can be rewritten as
Ek
[∫ θ
θ˜
Q[tA − t(γ)]∂F¯(β, τ)m(τ)
∂θ
dτ
]
> Ek
[
Q(tA − t(γ˜))
[
F¯(β˜, θ)m(θ) − F¯(F˜, θ˜)m(θ˜)
]]
(3.19)
Eθ
∫ k˜
k
QF¯(β, θ)
1
γ
dk
 > Eθ [QF¯(β˜, θ)1γ˜ (k˜ − k)
]
(3.20)
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(3.19) holds when β decreases in θ and F¯(β, θ) decreases in β. (3.20) holds
when
F¯(β, θ)
γ
decreases in k. 
Proposition 5. Under no information condition, the optimal design of the newly built
highway, (βN , γN), is determined by
β˜N =
k˜
γN(tA − t(γN))
t′(γN) =
k˜
(γN)2
(
m(θ) + β˜N
) (3.21)
where β˜N = βN +
1
2
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
(1 − m′(θ)) and k˜ = k + 1
2
Gk(k)
gk(k)
Proof. Based on Lemma 4, let U¯g = (uR(θ) + uc(k) − hR(θ) − hc(k)), then the first-
order conditions gives that
∂U¯g
∂β
⇒ (tA − t(γN))
(
βN +
1
2
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
(1 − m′(θ))
)
=
k +
1
2
Gk(k)
gk(k)
γN
∂U¯g
∂γ
⇒ t′(γN)
(
m(θ) + βN +
1
2
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
(1 − m′(θ))
)
=
k +
1
2
Gk(k)
gk(k)
(γN)2
Let β˜N = βN +
1
2
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
(1 − m′(θ)) and k˜ = k + 1
2
Gk(k)
gk(k)
and we get the (3.21).

From Proposition 5 we could observe that the optimal design of the infras-
tructure when there is no information only differs with the one under full infor-
mation case in two terms: β and k. In mechanism design literature, the k˜ is the
‘shadow cost’ and here we also have the β˜N as ‘shadow VOT threshold’ which is
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related to the toll rate on the highway. Therefore, the optimal design for asym-
metric information case is same as the symmetric one if we use the shadow cost
and the shadow VOT threshold.
3.2.4 Timing of the model
In the PPP renegotiation game discussed in this chapter, the events happen as
follows. The original design is determined to maximize expectation of social
welfare in the pre-tender and tender phases. This original design is denoted as
βE and γE. After the PPP contract is awarded to the private contractor, σ, θ and
k realize and are privately acquired by corresponding parties.
Then, the local official decide whether to kick off renegotiation process. If
her decision is no, then the game ends and the original design will be carried
out. The utility of the residents group and contractor, given the realization of θ
and k and the optimal design (βE, γE), will be
UNRR (θ) = Ek
[
QF¯(βE, θ)m(θ)(tA − t(γE))
]
(3.22)
and
UNRc (k) = Eθ
[
QF¯(βE, θ)βE(tA − t(γE)) − QF¯(βE, θ) k
γE
]
(3.23)
respectively. If the official decides to renegotiate, she will offer a take-it-or-
leave-it contract/agreement to the residents group and contractor.4 Afterward,
4Here we use agreement and contract interchangeably because the interaction between offi-
cial and residents group may not be in the form of a contract.
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the other two parties can accept or reject the offer. If either of the parties dis-
agree, there will be no renegotiation taking place and the original design will
be implemented. If both parties accept the contract, all the parties will enter the
renegotiation process.
In the renegotiation process, the local official will report her type to the cen-
tral government to be either σ = (θ, k) or σ = ∅. If the report type is (θ, k), which
implies that the central government possesses full information, the final design
and the monetary transfer will be determined by (3.3). Otherwise, central gov-
ernment will let the residents group and contractor report their type and the
design will be determined by (3.21) in Proposition 5.
Finally the design will be revised in compliance to the central/state govern-
ment’s standards or rules and the monetary transfer will be made. The timeline
of the model is shown in Figure 3.1.
Notice that, as the outside option for the residents group and contractor
(i.e. no renegotiation) is given in (3.22) and (3.23), the value of Ek
[
UNR (θ¯, k)
]
and Eθ
[
UNc (θ, k¯)
]
in (3.10) and (3.11) will be set as Ek
[
UNR (θ¯, k)
]
= UNRR (θ¯) and
Eθ
[
UNc (θ, k¯)
]
= UNRc (k¯) to minimize the total out-of-pocket expense of central gov-
ernment in asymmetric information case.
3.2.5 Delegation and collusion
In the real world, the management of PPP projects are usually delegated to local
official rather than held by central or state government usually due to transac-
tion cost.([48]) Therefore, the local official can coordinate with residents group
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During the pre-tender and
tender phases, the contract
is awarded to the contractor,
initial design is determined
based on estimation θE and kE
At the beginning of post-tender
phase, private information
σ, θ and k are realized and
known by the official, resi-
dents group and contractor
The official decides whether
to renegotiate
The official offers a contract to
residents group and contractor
Accept or decline decisions
from contractor and residents
group
The information is reported
according to the contract and
new design of the highway
is determined based on the
updates and central govern-
ment’s standard and rules
No renegotiation. The ini-
tial design is carried out
No
Yes
No
Yes
Figure 3.1: The flowchart of renegotiation process
and/or contractor to increase the benefit of their own and simultaneously harm
the social welfare. For simplicity, we follow the settings of most mechanism de-
sign and collusion literature and assume that all the parties will commit to the
contract they have agreed upon.5 Further, assume that the contractor can not
collude with the residents group.
Therefore, in the delegation settings, the monetary transfer from the govern-
ment Xc and XR will not be directly transferred to contractor and the residents
5For a review of literature in this field refer to Mookherjee (2006,9). Also, for literature with
a more relax assumption, refer to [31].
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group, respectively, but will be collected by official and redistributed to the two
parites. Therefore, the local official has the opportunity to misappropriate the
funding from central government. We assume that the monetary transfer be-
tween the local official and the residents group is xR(θˆ) and between the local
official and contractor xc(kˆ). It is not necessary that XR = xR or Xc = xc.
In the following sections, we will first start with two benchmark cases where
local official is benevolent (no collusion) and then discuss the distortion of the
outcome in renegotiation process when collusion is possible.
3.3 Benchmarks
The problem stating in Figure 3.1 can be tackle by backward induction. Specif-
ically, we can first consider the residents group and contractor’s utility func-
tions under different outcomes (renegotiation or no renegotiation) and then the
choices of residents and contractor given a contract will be clear. Based on such
information, the local official, whether benevolent or selfish, will design a rene-
gotiation contract to maximize her expected utility. The official then can com-
pare this maximal return from choosing renegotiation with the possible return
from no renegotiation. She will then choose whichever maximizes her utility.
Let us formalize the aforementioned process as follows. As discussed above,
the utility for the residents group and contractor under ‘no renegotiation’ (NR)
is UNRR (θ) and U
NR
c (k), respectively. On the contrary, if they both agree to renegoti-
ate, they will act according to the contract because we assume that the contract is
completely enforceable. Notice that the contract offered by local official consists
of the monetary transfer given type report of both parties. xc(kˆ) is the transfer
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from official to contractor and xR(θˆ) the transfer from official to residents group.
Therefore a contract/agreement between official, residents group and contrac-
tor is specified by ((θˆ, kˆ), xR(θˆ), xc(kˆ)). Then if both parties accept the official’s
contract to renegotiate, their utility will become URc (θ, θˆ) and URR(k, kˆ). As dis-
cussed above, the contractor will choose to renegotiate if URc (k, kˆ) > UNRc (k) and
vice versa and similar for the residents group.
Expecting this results, the official will design a contract, (x∗R(·), x∗c(·)) to maxi-
mize her utility Uo(θ, k, σ):
(x∗R(·), x∗c(·)) = argmax
xc,xR
Uo(θ, k, σ) (3.24)
Let URo (θ, k, σ) denote the expected utility when the official chooses to rene-
gotiate and UNRo (θ, k, σ) = 0 is the return if there is no renegotiate. Apparently,
official chooses renegotiation when URo (θ, k, σ) > UNRo (θ, k, σ) and vice verse. In
the following sections, we will discuss two benchmark cases where official is
benevolent with or without full information following the above process.
3.3.1 Benevolent official with full information
First we consider the case when local official is benevolent, which means that
she has same utility function as (3.2). In this case, the official will always let the
central government being informed, that is σ = (θ, k). Therefore, the (βF , γF) in
(3.3) is implemented and transfers XRc = XRR = 0.
The solution (βF , γF) maximizes the social welfare Ug(σ = (θ, k)). The central
government’s costless implementation of social optimum solution thanks to the
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full information possessed by benevolent official.
The outcome of the whole renegotiation process is stated as follows.
Proposition 6. When official is benevolent with full information, she will initiate rene-
gotiation if and only if
θ < θE
k < kE
(3.25)
where θE and kE satisfy βE = βF(θE, kE) and γE = γF(θE, kE).
Proof. In the renegotiation game, if all the parties agree to renegotiate, the final
design will be determined by (3.3). Therefore, the return for the contractor and
the residents group are (BF,R denotes ‘Benevolent officer with Full information,
Renegotiation’) UBF,Rc (k) = uc(k) and UBF,RR (θ) = uR(θ), respectively. On the other
hand, if design is not renegotiated, the return will be UBF,NRc (k) = UNRc (k) and
UBF,NRR (θ) = U
NR
R (θ). Following the definition of θE, kE that βE = β
F(θE, kE) and
γE = γ
F(θE, kE), we have UNRR (θ) = uR(θ, θE) and U
NR
c (k) = uc(k, kE).
Then we have the contractor and the residents group will accept to renego-
tiate if and only if
uR(θ) = uR(θ, θ) > uR(θ, θE)
uc(k) = uc(k, k) > uc(k, kE)
(3.26)
As the functions uR(θ, θˆ) is decreasing in θˆ and uc(k, kˆ) is decreasing in kˆ,6 we
have the condition as shown in (3.25).

6Need formal proof.
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Expecting this, it is obvious that the official will renegotiate the project as
long as the original design meets the condition specified in (3.25). The renego-
tiation will not always happen even if it will increase the total social welfare.
This is due to the fact that either contractor or the residents group will be worse
off after renegotiation. If this happens, as the central government will not com-
pensate the utility loss due to renegotiation, they will decline the offer from the
official.
3.3.2 Benevolent official with no information
In this section, we will discuss another extreme case in the renegotiation game:
a benevolent official has no information on (θ, k), that is σ = ∅. The outcome is
given in the following proposition
Proposition 7. If the official is benevolent with no information, she will initiate the
renegotiation following an all-or-nothing manor: either she will always initiate the
renegotiation or she will never initiate renegotiation. The renegotiation offer will be
accepted or rejected by the residents group or contractor according to the realization of
their types.
Proof. If there is no renegotiation, the utility functions of the residents group
and contractor are given in (3.22) and (3.23), respectively. However, as the offi-
cial does not possess information on θ and k, she can only use the expectation
to approximate the actual utilities of the two parties, (‘N,NR’ denotes ‘No infor-
mation, No Renegotiation’)
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UN,NRR = Eθ
[
UNRR (θ)
]
= Ek,θ
[
QF¯(βE, θ)m(θ)(tA − t(γE))
]
UN,NRc = Ek
[
UNRc (k)
]
= Ek,θ
[
QF¯(βE, θ)βE(tA − t(γE)) − QF¯(βE, θ) k
γE
] (3.27)
If the renegotiation offer is accepted by all parties, a benevolent official with
no information will report σ = ∅ and the social optimal design (βN , γN) is imple-
mented. Then the utility function of both parties are given in (3.15) and (3.16).
As initiating renegotiation is costly for the official, she will initiate it if and only
if
Eθ
[
UNR (θ)
]
> Eθ
[
UN,NRR (θ)
]
Ek
[
UNc (k)
]
> Ek
[
UN,NRc (k)
] (3.28)
Notice that, the LHS and RHS in both inequalities in (3.28) are all numbers.
Therefore, the official will follow a all-or-noting manor: either always initiating
the renegotiation or never. This is because she does not know the exact realiza-
tion of types of both parties.
On the other hand, as both parties know their own types, they will decide
whether to accept or not the renegotiation offer by
UNR (θ) > U
NR
R (θ)
UNc (k) > U
NR
c (k)
(3.29)
This implies that the renegotiation offer will not always be accepted as
the two parties may have actual renegotiation utility lower than the non-
renegotiation one.

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Proposition 7 indicates that although whether the residents group and con-
tractor agree to renegotiate still depend on their private types, θ and k, the initi-
ation of renegotiation by official does not depend on the realization. When the
official has no information, a series of consistent decisions will be made (either
renegotiation or not).
In reality, the official may neither possesses full information nor no informa-
tion. Some literature discussed that the official can acquires indicating signals
on the types of parties. Under this situation, it would be the combination of
the cases we discuss above. The outcome of renegotiation result will neither
be absolutely deterministic, nor be totally random to the official. Therefore, the
initiation of renegotiation by the official will have some probability to be all-
or-nothing (no information case) and some probability to be fully deterministic
(full information case).
In this section, we discuss the renegotiation outcome when the local official
is benevolent. In this following section, the assumption is the official is selfish
and is able to collude with parties to maximize her own utility.
3.4 Collusion in renegotiation process
When local official is selfish, she will have incentive to collude with residents
group and/or contractor if such behavior increases her utility. In this section,
we will first discuss the result when local official collude with both parties, then
analyze the situation when she coordinates with specific agent or part of the
residents group.
73
The collusion game discuss here is initiated by official who will collude with
all possible parties; that is, if she has the ability to collude with a certain party,
she will always attempt to do so.7 When the official contracts with different par-
ties, she will specify the report sent to the central government, which will hence
decide the design of the highway, and the monetary transfer between the official
and the parties. In other word, the contract is specified by (m(θ, k, σ), xr(θˆ), xc(kˆ)),
where the message m(θ, k, σ) = (θˆ, kˆ, σˆ) and the monetary transfers from official
to the residents group or contractor depend on the type reported.
In our model, there are two chances left for local official to benefit from col-
lusion. From previous section, central government has to provide information
rent to residents group and contractor when official has no information about
their types. This lends opportunity to a selfish and fully informed official to
reap these extra benefit as pointed out in [48]). This is because, when the offi-
cial is informed, the information rent for the residents group and contractor is
0 if the official reports honestly. Therefore, an informed but selfish local official
can collude with residents group and contractor to ask for bribes and report ’no
information’, σ = ∅, to central government. She then can leave the residents
group and contractor with utility no worse than the situation when there is no
renegotiation and take away all the information rent the central government
leaves.8 Therefore, when the local official possesses full information, from self-
ish motivation, given that there will be renegotiation, she will always report ‘no
information’ and benefit from such misreport.
7As we show later, this is without loss of generality because collusion with more parties will
always benefit the official.
8One more additional assumption needed here is that the official has full bargain power.
As it is pointed out in other literature, for example [48], however, full bargain power is not a
necessary condition. As long as the local official possesses at least some bargain power and is
able to predict the result of the collusion, she can exert her ability to benefit from this.
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Another opportunity the central government leaves for a selfish official to
collude with contractor or the residents group is, the rigid rule of final design of
the infrastructure blocked the possibility of renegotiation when the conditions
(3.25) and (3.28) are not met under full information and no information cases,
respectively. Through colluding with both parties, the local official is able to
compensate the party with the utility loss. However, this would not be desirable
because even the total utility becomes social optimal, part of it goes to official’s
private pocket.
Collusion and corruption between official (supervisor, monitor) and contrac-
tor (agent) are extensively discussed in the literature of collusion in mechanism
design and corruption in PPP. However, few literature considers collusion with
consumer and producer at the same time and the discussion about collusion
with part of a heterogeneous group is absent.
In our model, we incorporate heterogeneous users and multiple agents to
enable such analysis. Therefore, in this section, we will discuss the cases when
official collude with both parties, the residents group only or part of the resi-
dents group.
3.4.1 Collusion with both parties
When the local official is selfish and can collude with both parties, mathemati-
cally it means that Xc , xc and XR , xR, that is, the official can compensate the
utility loss or steal the utility gain of the two parties. We have the following
proposition.
Proposition 8. When local official colludes with both parties, we have the following
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results:
• If local official has no information, she will be indifferent in renegotiation;
– Official will not gain utility from renegotiation;
– The return of contractor and residents group will be same as the benevolent
case;
• If local official has full information, she will be more likely to renegotiate than in
benevolent case. The report is σ = ∅. Moreover,
– Both parties’ (contractor and residents group) ex post utilities are same as
their ‘no renegotiation’ utility;
– All the excessive utility will be taken away by official.
– Both parties will always accept the renegotiation offer.
Proof. We still follows the analysis process in Section 3.3 to study the result of
the renegotiation game.
First assume that if both parties accept the offer from local official to renego-
tiate, then the local official will report σ = ∅ to the central government no matter
what information she possesses. Then the new design will be (βN , γN) in (3.21).
The central government will transfer Xc(k) + XR(θ) to the official who thereafter
decides the redistribution of fund. If she has full information, the distribution
of fund should satisfy the following constraints:
uR(θ) + uc(k) + xR(θ) + xc(k) > uR(θ, θE) + uc(k, kE)
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Otherwise, if she does not possess information, she has to provide the con-
tractor and the residents group with the same incentive specified in (3.10) and
(3.11) and thus she has to redistribute all the funds she received from the central
government. Therefore, local official’s return from the renegotiation game (let
SCB denote Selfish official Colluding with Both parties)
USCBo (θ, k, σ) = max [1σ,∅ {uc(k) + Xc(k) + uR(θ) + XR(θ)
−uc(k, kE) − uR(θ, θE)} , 0] (3.30)
Where the function 1σ,∅ is defined as
1σ,∅ =

1 if σ , ∅;
0 Otherwise.
Given (3.30), the local official will be indifferent on renegotiation if she has
no information. She will always attempt to renegotiate the design when (3.30)
holds. Compared with the renegotiation condition in Section 3.3, (3.30) is less
strict than (3.26) and same as (3.28). Therefore, renegotiation is more likely and
design will be changed in full information case. However, the utilities of ei-
ther contractor and the residents group will not change under full information
condition.
Also, as the official has full information about the types of both residents
group and contractor, she will initiate renegotiation offer if and only if she
knows it will be accepted. Therefore, we will observe that the residents group
and contractor will always accept the renegotiation.
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From Proposition 8, collusion will have three takeaways on the PPP project.
The first effect is that collusion increases the possibility of renegotiation when
local official is fully informed. Informed official will attempt to capitalize the in-
formation advantage she has compared to the central government by colluding
with different parties and hide the information. This indicates that, the obser-
vation in empirical study (such as [40]) that renegotiation in PPP usually hap-
pened in early stages after the contracts were awarded could also be a result of
collusion.
The second effect of collusion is that, the total social welfare in the rene-
gotiation of collusion is always less than or equal to the one if the official is
benevolent. Attributed to the official always reporting no information, the final
social welfare will always be UNg (θ, k) which is less than the first best social wel-
fare. As a consequence, although the renegotiation seems to make the society
better off, it is actually not. The central government does inflate its expense in
the jurisdiction of the officer, however, all the extra benefit, which is the part in
the curly bracket in (3.30), flows to the local official in the form of transfers we
discussed above.
Thirdly, Proposition 8 also provides one important and effective way to de-
tect collusion in renegotiation process. Although the informed official will hide
her information and act as an uninformed one, the outcome of the renegotiation
will be different. For an uninformed and benevolent official, if she attempt to
renegotiate the design, the offer can be turned off by either the contractor or
the residents group. However, for an informed but selfish official, every rene-
gotiation offer from her will be accepted by the latter two parties because she
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will only initiate it whenever she know it will be accepted. Therefore, smooth
renegotiation process can be a red flag for an official.
3.4.2 Collusion with one party only
Collusion with only one party is already extensively studied in literature. How-
ever, in the existing literature, collusion with one party with the presence of
another non-colluding party is absent. In this section, the case that official col-
ludes with only the residents group is presented.
If collusion is possible only between official and the residents group, but not
between official and contractor, we have Xc = xc because the official can not
side transfer money to or from the contractor. However, it is still possible that
XR , xR. Similar as the section above, to be better off through collusion, the
official will first attempt to increase the utility of the residents group and then
take away a proper amount to ensure the group to be still willing to collude.
The result of such collusion is given in the proposition below.
Proposition 9. When local official colludes with only the residents group, we have the
following results:
• If local official has no information, the result is unchanged from the benevolent
official with no information ones;
• If local official has full information,
– The renegotiation is more likely than benevolent case but less likely than the
case that collude with both parties;
– The residents group will always accept the offer to renegotiate.
79
Proof. If the outcome is ‘no renegotiation’, the local official’s utility is 0. Same
as previous sections, the utility of the residents group in no renegotiation out-
come is uR(θ, θE). Expecting this, the official has to provide the residents group
with return at least equals to uR(θ, θE). On the other hand, as the official can not
collude with the contractor, no side payment is possible.
If the officer has no information, σ = ∅, same as previous section, she will
have to distribute all the utility to the residents group and the contractor to
induce truth-telling. If she has full information but still reports no information,
the central government will secure the contractor’s utility as Ek
[
UNc (k)
]
and the
residents group’s utility as Eθ
[
UNR (θ)
]
by implementing the (βN , γN). In turn, the
official knows that the utility function of the residents group and the contractor
are UNR (θ) and U
N
c (k), respectively. Hence the condition that both parties will
agree to renegotiate is
uNc (k) > uc(k, kE)
uNR (θ) > uR(θ, θE)
(3.31)
It is obvious that the constraints when official is benevolent with full infor-
mation is stricter because the utility transferred from central government to the
residents group does not contain information rent. This implies that renegotia-
tion happens more frequently then benevolent case even when only one party
act along with the official. However, (3.31) is stricter than its counterparts when
official colludes with both parities, (3.30). Therefore the renegotiation will be
less likely in this case. Morever, similar to previous discussion, when the offi-
cial possesses full information, the offer will always be accepted by the residents
group and contractor.
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In Proposition 9, compare (3.31) with (3.29), the renegotiation condition
when official is benevolent with no information and selfish but informed look
similar. In (3.31), the outside options on the RHS of two inequalities is the util-
ities if there is no renegotiation while in (3.29), it is the expectation of these
utilities. Although the renegotiation decision made by the official under benev-
olent situation is all-or-nothing while under selfish situation it depends on the
realization of type. They are equivalent ex ante, that is before the realization.
Therefore, to prevent renegotiation ex ante, the central government would pre-
fer this case than the case official colluding with both parties.
Another reason the central government should prefer this case is that from
Proposition 9, with the presence of another non-colluding party, the condition
for realizing corruption is stricter than when colluding with both parties is pos-
sible. This is because, if the official can collude with the contractor, when the
utility the contractor get from renegotiation is less than no renegotiation, she
can boost the utility by transfer more benefit she gets from the residents group.
This whole process is impossible in the non-colluding contractor case.
This implies that, to prevent non-Pareto-improving renegotiation, even if
eliminating all the possibilities is impossible, making collusion extreme hard
with one party will effectively restrict the extent of corruption. In the real world
Public-Private Partnership projects, as a legal identity, the contractors is usually
much easier to be regulated compared with the residents group ([25]). The reg-
ulator should then focus on laws stipulating the behaviour of contractor and the
interaction between it and local officials.
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Although in this section, we only discuss the situation when local official
colludes with the residents group, the outcome of the case when the local of-
ficial colludes only with contractor can be derived similarly, which is left for
interested readers.
3.4.3 Collusion with part of the residents
In this section we consider that, when local official colludes with part of the
residents group. The local official may have own political preference and hence
put more weight on the utility of part of the residents group, or, only some
residents have the ability to directly interact with local official and influence
her decision. Under both situations, the local official will ignore the rest of the
residents group. There are two extreme cases, the colluding part of the residents
is those with VOT larger than a given threshold, β0, denoted as ‘H’ (high) and
those with VOT less than another different threshold β1, denoted as ‘L’ (low).
For simplicity, we assume that the possible types θ and k will ensure group
H always uses the newly built highway but group L always traveling on the
existing roads. 9 Although the rest of the residents group can not influence the
local official’s infrastructure decision they will still be able to receive monetary
transfer from central government (if any). However, the official cannot collude
with them therefore can not change the amount of transfer accordingly.
Consider only residents group H with VOT > β0 can influence the decision of
local official. The population of group H is QF¯(β0, θ). For simplicity, we assume
that β0 is large enough such that this group of residents will always choose the
9This is equivalent to assume that there exist a party that will always be influenced by both
the infrastructure decision and the payment (H) and another group will only be influenced by
the payment decision
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newly built highway. Therefore, the travel time improvement group H enjoys
from the newly built highway is Ek
[
QF¯(β0, θ)(m(θ) + β0)(tA − t(γ))
]
. The toll paid
to the contractor will be Ek
[
β(tA − t(γ))QF¯(β0, θ)
]
. Then the utility function of this
group of residents is
UH(θ, θˆ) = uH(θ, θˆ) + xH(θˆ) (3.32)
where uH(θ, θˆ) = Ek
[
QF¯(β0, θ)[(m(β0) + β0)[tA − t(γˆ)]] − βˆ[tA − t(γˆ)]QF¯(β0, θ)
]
is
the utility directly get from the highway and XH(θˆ) is the amount of monetary
transfer from the central government. This amount should be a proportion of
the monetary transfer from the central government to the residents group, that
is XH(θˆ) = F¯(β0, θ)XR(θˆ).
When the official has no information, to induce truth-telling from the resi-
dents group H, she has to guarantee a minimal utility level given in the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 10. When uninformed local official colludes with only residents group H, she
has to provide the residents group with minimal utility
Eθ [UH(θ)] = UH(θ¯) − Eθ,k
[
Q(tA − t(γ))∂F¯(β0, θ)(m(θ) + β0 − β)
∂θ
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
]
(3.33)
Proof. This Lemma can be easily proved by similar process in previous sections.
Therefore is omitted here. 
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 11. When local official colludes only with residents group H:
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• If the official has no information, she will be either strictly like, dislike or indiffer-
ent with the renegotiation;
• If the official has full information, renegotiation will be less likely than the case
colluding with the whole residents group R.
Proof. Although the monetary transfer from the central government to the res-
idents group is as a whole, it could be divided into part that goes to residents
group H and part does not. The monetary transfer goes to the residents group
H when official has different reports are
XH(θ) =

[
UNR − Eθ[uR(θ)]
]
F¯(β0, θ) When official’s report is σ = ∅
0 When official’s report is σ = (θ, k)
(3.34)
Following the same process in the previous sections, if there is no renegotia-
tion, for local official the return is 0, for residents group H it is uH(θ, θE) and for
contractor it is uc(k, kE). If all three parties agree to enter the renegotiation game
(official, group H and contractor), the official will decide her report to choose
the one with higher value in (3.34) .10
If the official does not have information, she will provide the residents group
H with utility
UNH(θ) = UH(θ¯) −
∫ θ¯
θ
Ek
[
Q(tA − t(γ))
[
∂F¯(β0, ω)(m(ω) + β0 − β)
∂ω
]]
dω
to induce truth-telling.
10For now we assume that the higher one is no information. We need to revise this further.
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Then the required monetary transfer to induce truthtelling given the report
θ is (through integration by parts)
xH(θ) = UH(θ¯) − uH(θ¯) +
∫ θ¯
θ
Ek
[
QF¯(β0, ω)(m(ω) + β0 − β)∂t(γ)dω
]
dω
Notice that when the official offer the contract to residents group H, she does
not know the realization of θ, therefore, the expected monetary transfer is
Eθ [xH(θ)] = UH(θ¯) − uH(θ¯) + Eθ,k
[
QF¯(β0, θ)(m(θ) + β0 − β)∂t(γ)
∂θ
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
]
(3.35)
While the expected transfer from the government to the residents group H
Eθ [XH(θ)] = (UR(θ¯) − uR(θ¯))Eθ
[
F¯(β0, θ)
]
+ Eθ,k
[
QF¯(β, θ)F¯(β0, θ)m(θ)
∂t(γ)
∂θ
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
]
(3.36)
Therefore, the official will strictly prefer renegotiation if the expected trans-
fer from the central government, (3.36) is larger than the required expected
transfer from her to the residents group H, (3.35), which means that she can
take away part of the benefit for herself. On the other hand, if (3.35) < (3.36),
which means that the central government’s fund is insufficient for the official to
induce truthtelling from residents group H. It is also trivial that (3.35) = (3.36)
indicates that the official is indifferent with the renegotiation.
If the official is fully informed, as we discussed in previous sections, she will
leave exactly uH(θ, θE) for the residents group H and pass full amount of utility
85
to contractor because he is non-colluding. Therefore the renegotiation condition
is
uNc (k) > uc(k, kE)
uH(θ) + XH(θ) > uH(θ, θE)
(3.37)
Notice that (3.37) and (3.31) only differs in the second inequality. In (3.31), the
second inequality can be rewritten as
UR(θ¯) − uR(θ¯) +
∫ θ¯
θ
QF¯(β, ω)m(ω)
∂t(γ)
∂θ
dω > QF¯(βE, θ)m(θ)(tA − t(γE)) (3.38)
UR(θ¯) − uR(θ¯) +
∫ θ¯
θ
QF¯(β, ω)m(ω)
∂t(γ)
∂θ
dω > Q(m(θ) + β0 − βE)(tA − t(γE)) (3.39)
Because LHS of (3.38) and (3.39) are the same and on the RHS we have
F¯(βE, θ)m(θ) < m(θ) < m(θ) + β0 − βE
due to the assumption that β0 > βE, we have that the condition (3.38) is less
strict than (3.39). Therefore, when the official colludes with the residents group
H, she will be less likely to initiate a renegotiation.
It is still obvious that the local official is less likely to renegotiate than the
case when she colludes with both parties. In consequence, the utility function
of the official is (let SCH denote ‘Selfish official Colluding with residents group
H’)
USCHo (θ, k, σ) = max [1σ,∅ {uH(θ) + XH(θ) − uH(θ, kE)} , 0] (3.40)

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Proposition (11) provides further guidelines for regulating renegotiation
game. When the official is informed, unlike the case official colluding with
the entire residents group, the official colluding with an interest group will be
less likely to initiate renegotiation in general. This is because, when there is
renegotiation, part of monetary transfer will be taken by the residents she does
not collude with (‘free riders’). This makes renegotiation less attractive to her.
Therefore restricting the collusion ability of official is beneficial.
However, when the official possesses no information, Proposition (11) and
its proof indicates that the benefit of further restricting official’s potential col-
luding party is not clear. She may strictly prefer renegotiation over no rene-
gotiation. This will make the society worse off compared to when the official
can collude with the whole party. Hence, whether constrain the collusion abil-
ity of the official depends on how difficult it is for the official to incentivize the
residents group H.
3.5 Discussion
3.5.1 Official’s preference on procurement cost
When colluding with residents group H, the official’s utility function is given
by (3.40) and based on the definition of uH and XH, we have when the official
has full information and she reports no information σ = ∅ and her utility is
uH(θ) + XH(θ) − uH(θ, θE)
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= Q
[
F¯(β0, θ) − F¯(β0, θ)
]
(m(θ) + β0 − βE)(tA − t(γE))
−
∫ θ¯
θ
QF¯(tA − t(γ))d
[
F¯(β0, θ)(m(θ) + β0)
]
(3.41)
As we discuss in previous sections, under no information condition, the de-
sign variable γ will increase in k. Therefore, it is easy to check that equation
(3.41) will be increasing in k. This indicates that if the local official colludes with
the residents group H, she will prefer higher unit cost of the road as this will in-
crease the information rent central government transfer to her. With higher unit
cost, the local official can help the residents group H has higher utility increase
ex post. In PPP literature, private side innovation to decrease the procurement
cost is one of the dominating advantage of PPP. However, here we illustrates
that, with the threats of collusion, such an advantage may not be favored by
local official.
Local official disliking the lower procurement cost has two effects. First,
this preference will incentivize official to discourage contractor to make any
attempt of innovation, especially considering that contractor could also be col-
luding with official. Second, such a preference can induce suboptimal choice
in the tender phase of the infrastructure project. Expecting that renegotiation is
inevitable and contractor’s cost will influence her ex post return from renego-
tiation, the local official will select contractor with highest possible cost in the
auction. Notice that ‘highest possible cost’ does not mean highest cost among
all bidder. It could be the highest cost among bidders within a range. Such a
behavior is hard to be detected because it could also be induced by the measure
to avoid ‘curse of the winner’.11
11Reference needed.
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3.5.2 Multiple stakeholders in renegotiation game
Compared to other literature in renegotiation in public-private partnership, we
consider a game where there are multiple stakeholders which include both con-
sumers and producers in the renegotiation game. In this game, a selfish official
would prefer renegotiation, which is in line with other literature. Moreover,
we identify that, with the presence of a non-colluding party who can decline
renegotiation offer, the non-social-optimal renegotiation will be less likely. The
implication is two-fold: first, the central government should at least endorse
some parties in PPP project with the ability to decline a government-led rene-
gotiation process. Such an ability can greatly restrict the official’s opportunity
to kick off renegotiation process that benefit herself.
The second implication is that, central government should regulate and
monitor the parties who has the ability to decline the renegotiation offers from
the official. As Proposition 9 shows, when the official is only able to collude
with one party with the presence of another party who can turn down the rene-
gotiation contract, there is a large reduction in her willingness to start a rene-
gotiation. Given that in PPP projects in real world, the number of parties who
can influence the renegotiation is limited, such regulation is not difficult to be
implemented.
3.5.3 Heterogeneity within stakeholders in PPP regulation
In this chapter, the residents party is heterogeneous which enables the official
to collude with certain part of the group. In the discussion in Section 3.4.3, the
official’s colluding ability is restricted to only part ‘H’ and therefore the oppor-
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tunity of renegotiation is reduced. Notice that group ‘H’ indicates those who
directly benefit from the renegotiation. There is also part of the residents group,
who has relatively low VOT, always uses the old highway, and does not ben-
efit from the PPP project directly. We call this part of people as ‘free rider’ of
renegotiation. In PPP renegotiation, part of a stakeholder group could be free
rider, besides the users of old highway in this chapter, it could also be non-
union workers, or part of the procuring consortium who will not be affected by
renegotiation but receives information rent from the central government. If cen-
tral government can prevent collusion between the official and the free riders,
for example by auditing or increasing corruption cost, it will be more effective
compared to regulation targeting on other parties.
3.5.4 Role of asymmetric information
In this chapter, unlike the renegotiation game in [43], we assume that the lo-
cal official also possesses private information on whether she knows the pri-
vate information of contractor and residents group. This consideration helps us
understand how the official act with information advantage to central govern-
ment and bargain power to the residents group and contractor. In this model,
we observe that a selfish official with full information will be more interested in
renegotiation than benevolent official who only initiate Pareto-improving rene-
gotiation. This is due to that the selfish official will attempt to cash out the
information rent she possesses. The informational asymmetry provides the of-
ficial to pursue personal benefits from renegotiation. Such benefit may be in the
form of money (such as bribe or political donation), political credit, or in other
invisible forms such as underground agreement.([25])
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We assume that the official can only manipulate her private information to
the extent whether she knows or not the actual private information of contractor
and the residents group. A more flexible setting will be the official can also mis-
report the real value of the private information of those two parties ([31]). How-
ever, only with this stricter assumption, the official already take a big advantage
against central government’s regulation. Even though central government sets
hard, even rigid, rules on the optimality of the design of the highway, which
seems prevents potential manipulation, in renegotiation game, it still leaves the
local official room to exploit illicit benefits by choosing which project to renego-
tiate.
3.5.5 Incentive contract for official
If we take as given the fact that informational asymmetry cannot be easily al-
tered, past literature suggests to offer a contractual agreement to official to make
her truth-telling ([48]). The official will receive a larger reward for reporting in-
formative type rather than σ = ∅. The amount is determined by the possible
gain if a informed but selfish official report no information. By providing such
incentive, the central government can restrain the possibility of collusion.
However, from the result in this chapter, the central government should be
cautious in providing such incentive contract under multiple stakeholders as-
sumption. Although such incentive contract can prevent non-benevolent rene-
gotiation that would happen, it may facilitate other renegotiation that would not
happen. For example, in colluding with only the residents group case, without
incentive contract, the official will not initiate a renegotiation when both parties
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are better off from the renegotiation and she will take the gain from the resi-
dents group. However, with the incentive contract, although she will be honest
in that case, she will prefer to initiate a renegotiation when only the contractor
will be better off. This is because, without incentive contract, she cannot benefit
from the utility gain from the contractor, while such gain will be provided by
central government in the incentive contract.
Therefore, under multiple stakeholders settings, without the knowledge of
colluding party, the central government can not effectively prevent corruption
through providing incentive contract. This kind of contract can only partially
prevent renegotiation and offer official with other opportunity to corrupt.
3.6 Policy implications and regulation guidelines
From the previous discussion, it is apparent that renegotiation as a result of
collusion is not beneficial for the whole society and central government should
eliminate opportunities for official to exploit personal benefit from it. In this
section, as a summary, we provide policy implications and regulation guidelines
for central government to prevent corruption and collusion in renegotiation of
PPP. For convenience of the readers, every point is followed by the sections in
which it is discussed.
• The result of renegotiation game is a good detection measure of collusion.
If the renegotiation offers are always accepted by all parties and the official
reports ‘no information’, it is a strong sign of corruption. (3.4.1, 3.4.2)
• Selection of higher procurement cost could be a sign of anticipating op-
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portunities of collusion in post-tender phase. All the high cost selection
should be justified. (3.5.1)
• Stakeholders other than government should be endorsed with power to
decline renegotiation. (3.4.2, 3.5.2)
• Free riders (such as non-union workers, residents not influenced by PPP
projects but will receive monetary transfers) and interest groups that
can not decline renegotiation should be closely monitored and regulated.
(3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.5.4)
• Colluding only with non-free-rider group can help reduce the possibility
of renegotiation that is not socially optimal. (3.4.2, 3.5.4)
• Incentive contract should not be implemented before the central govern-
ment acquiring the information on who will collude with official. (3.5.5)
3.7 Main Findings
In this chapter we discover that, in line with [48], under asymmetric information
the PPP projects are prone to collusion. The corrupted official has a tendency
to renegotiation compared to benevolent official because of the information ad-
vantage she possesses. When the official possesses full information about the
residents group and contractor, she realize personal benefit by lying to the cen-
tral government and transferring utilities between the other two parties by side
contracting. Therefore, in general, the possibility of government-led renegotia-
tion increases as a result of collusion.
We also explore the situation where the official can only collude with only
one party, assuming that due to perfect monitor or inability of collusion, the of-
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ficial can not collude with another one. Under this circumstance, the official is
less likely to initiate the a non-social optimal renegotiation because it is difficult
for her to transfer the utility between two parties by side contracting. This indi-
cates that, even though eliminating collusion might be impossible, restraining
the collusion ability of the official could also be beneficiary for the society.
Furthermore, we discuss the situation when the users are heterogeneous. We
discover that, when the government official colludes with only part of the res-
idents group, she will be either less likely to renegotiate contract unduly. This
is because that the rest part of the residents could be free riders of the rene-
gotiation and therefore renegotiate is less attractive to a selfish official, which
indicates that corruption can further be alleviated by closely monitoring cer-
tain group of ‘free rider’ users, such as users not affected by the PPP projects,
non-union workers, etc.
Lastly, we discuss the policy implication and regulation guildelines for cen-
tral or state government in PPP projects. Here are some highlights of our results
(A complete summary is in Section 3.6). We suggest that the central or state
government should give rights to some of the stakeholders in PPP projects to
decline renegotiation attempts. Also, these parties should be closely monitored
because they are vulnarable to corruption. Heterogeneity will induce free rider
inside a single stakeholder and such party should be closely monitored. The
government can detect corruption ex post by monitoring the renegotiation out-
come. If all the renegotiation offers from local official are constantly accepted by
other parties and the local official always has uninformative types, it is a strong
sign of corruption.
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3.8 Contributions
Our contribution is three-fold:
Firstly, we extend the theory of mechanism design with a model of collusion
between supervisor, producer and heterogeneous consumers. Previous research
either only consider the supervisor colluding with only producer (e.g. [20], [56])
or only consumers ([15]), but not both. In this piece, by incorporating both
consumers and producers, we show that collusion can be partially prevented if
the supervisor’s colluding ability is restricted to only one party.
Secondly, we bridge the gap between economic models and engineering
models in PPP literature. Economic models, featured with simplicity and pol-
icy implications, and engineering models, with technical details and regulation
guidelines, achieve big successes in PPP separately in the past. However, as
PPP project is highly specialized, both economic and engineering should be put
under the same umbrella to provide consistent policy implication and regula-
tion guidelines. This requires a uniform model capable for both economic and
engineering theories and models. However, to our best knowledge, such model
is not available.
Lastly, as a result of building a uniform model compatible for both economic
theories and engineering models, we provide several useful policy implication
and operation guidelines. Some of them are already pointed out above.
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CHAPTER 4
STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT, DECENTRALIZATION AND AGENCY
PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC
INFRASTRCUTURE MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
Private participation in public procurement has already been recognized as an
essential approach in providing public infrastructure and related services by
both practitioner and researcher ([44]). Such form of procurement is usually
referred to as Public-Private Partnership (PPP) which may include different
variation, such as “Build-Operate-Transfer” (BOT) and “Build-Own-Operate”
(BOO). In PPP, the private sector takes part of or whole ownership of the infras-
tructure and share revenue and risk with the government. Previous literature
finds evidences supporting that by introducing private sector into traditional
public infrastructure procurement, PPP improves the managerial, financial and
technological efficiency of the process ([43]).
In this chapter, we build a framework studying corruption in PPP that is able
to incorporate these various key factors, which, to our best knowledge, is not
readily available yet. We build a hierarchical model with a central government,
a local official, a contractor and a residents group to depict the decentralization
in PPP. A benevolent central government delegates the decision to a local offi-
cial through a governmental contract. Then the local official can individually
interact with the contractor and the residents group. As stakeholders, both con-
tractor and the residents group can influence the decison of the official through
side transfer such as bribes. Moreover, the infrastructure project’s design de-
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pends on some critical but uncertain factors. The realization of these factors, or
types, is possessed privately by the residents group and contractor. The official
may (resp. or may not) observe the real type of the other two parties, which
is referred as possession ‘full information’ (resp. ‘no information’). If she has
‘no information’1, she can only report so and the central government has to let
both parties to report their own types. On the other hand, if she possesses ‘full
information’, she can choose between reporting ‘full information’ or ‘no infor-
mation’ (hiding her information from central government). If she reports ‘no
information’, central government obtains nothing same as previous case. If she
reports ‘full information’, the types of contractor and the residents group can be
observed by central government without any distortion (hard information).
We apply this model to a post-tender phase renegotiation game to investi-
gate how the corruption and collusion will influence the outcome and how the
central government can prevent or take advantage of collusion. In our model, a
highway project in the official’s jurisdiction will be renegotiate due to the unex-
pected realization of uncertainty. The renegotiation game progresses as follows.
In the pre-tender phase, the highway is designed based on the estimation of un-
certainty and in the tender phase, the contract is signed. After the tender phase,
the uncertainty realizes and both the official and the contractor may find rene-
gotiation attractive and they both can propose a renegotiation offer. If neither
party initiates renegotiation, the game ends and the initial design is carried out.
Otherwise, one of the parties proposing renegotiation will lead it. If every party
agrees on the proposal, the design is revised and the contract is resigned.
1In this chapter, we use ‘her’ for the local official, ‘he’ for the residents group and contractor,
and ‘it’ for central or state government to avoid confusion.
97
4.2 The model
In this chapter we consider the renegotiation game in post-tender phase of a
PPP project, specifically, a highway project between point A and B. There is an
existing local road connecting these two points with constant travel time tA. The
design of new highway consists of two decision variables: the travel time and
the toll rate. The travel time of the new highway is denoted as t(γ) with γ denot-
ing the V/C ratio on the highway. The local travellers are heterogeneous with
regards to their value of time (VOT). Let β denote the smallest VOT of travellers.
From user equilibrium, we know that this group of travellers is indifferent be-
tween using local road for free and new highway with toll rate p, which is
tA = t(γ) +
p
β
Therefore, the toll rate p can be indirectly express as p = (tA − t(γ))β. Then
we can use the pair (β, γ) to denote the decision variables of the new highway.
Furthermore, assume that the cost of building the highway is kC, where C is the
capacity of the highway and k is the cost of one unit of capacity.
The group of residents currently traveling between A and B is denoted as
group r. we assume that the total demand between A and B does not change
after the new highway being built. The residents have heterogeneous VOTs.
The VOT follows Pareto distribution with cumulative density function (CDF):
F(β, θ) = 1 −
(β
β
)θ
where β is the lower bound of VOT value. Then given the toll rate set as β,
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the amount of users on the highway is
F¯(β, θ) = 1 − F(β, θ) =
(β
β
)θ
,
and hence the capacity C can be calculated as C =
(β
β
)θ
1
γ
.
4.2.1 Stakeholders
In this chapter we consider four stakeholders in a decentralized PPP project:
central government, local official, contractor and the residents group. When a
project is procured through decentralization, the decision is most likely dele-
gated to local officials from central government ([48]), where officials coordi-
nate with selected contractors to determine the contract and design details of
the newly built infrastructure. The travellers (residents) will either travel on ex-
isting local road or newly built highway. The highway user will be charged toll
for the usage. The funding could come from either the user charge and also the
central government fund.
In renegotiation in the post-tender phase, either the local official and the
contractor can initiate a proposal. Such proposal should be approved by all
three parties: government represented by the local official, the contractor and
the residents group. Through out this chapter, we assume that the contractor,
the residents group and the official are all self-interested. The contractor, act-
ing as a private company, will attempt to maximize profit through renegotia-
tion. The official is willing to take bribe from both contractor and the residents
group, which may be in the form of personal benefit, political donation, or po-
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litical capital such as the chances of being reelected. The local residents could
also participate in the collusion to minimize their payment (toll and tax) and/or
maximize the transportation benefit from the highway.
In the contrary, the central or state government in this chapter is regarded
as benevolent and focuses on maximizing social welfare. However, central gov-
ernment does not possess the information needed to procure the infrastructure
optimally and hence has to rely on the local official. In the following section, the
information structure will be discussed.
4.2.2 Information structure
Our model entails adverse selection problem in economic literature. All three
parties except central government possess private information. The contractor
privately knows the unit procurement cost k ∈ [k, k¯] and the residents group
holds the parameter of VOT distribution, θ ∈ [θ, θ¯]. Let Gθ(·) and Gk(·) denote
the cumulative distribution function of θ and k, respectively and gθ(·) = G′θ(·),
gk(·) = G′k(·). The support and distributions of θ and k are public information.
θ and k realize after the tender phase ends and are held by the residents group
and the contractor respectively. The local official, on the other hand, has chance
to learn the realization of θ and k. Let sigma denote the type of local official with
σ = (θ, k) representing informed official and σ = ∅ uninformed official. During
the renegotiation phase, all three parties need to report their type to central gov-
ernment, denoted as (θˆ, kˆ, σˆ), which are not necessarily truthful. Although the
reported types are subjected to manipulation, we follow the ‘hard information’
settings from [48], which means that if the local official possesses and reports
100
‘full information’, the central government can directly observe the real type of
the residents group and contractor without possibility of manipulation.
4.2.3 Utility functions
The residents group r as a whole is maximizing the sum of the net benefit from
the highway, ur(·) and the subsidies from the government, Xr(·), with the expec-
tation on contractor’s type, k:
Ur(θ, θˆ) = ur(θ, θˆ) + Xr(θˆ) (4.1)
where ur(θ, θˆ) = Ek
[
QF¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ)m(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ)(tA − t(γ(θˆ, kˆ)))
]
denotes mone-
tized value of travel time saving from the newly built highway minus the cost
of toll.
The utility function of contractor is the profit from the newly built high-
way, uc(·) plus the possible subsidies, Xc(·) given the expectation of the resident’s
group type θ:
Uc(k, kˆ) = uc(k, kˆ) + Xc(kˆ) (4.2)
where uc(k, kˆ) = Eθ
[
QF¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ)β(θˆ, kˆ)(tA − t(γ(θˆ, kˆ))) − QF¯(β(θˆ, kˆ), θ) k
γ(θˆ, kˆ)
]
is the
toll revenue from the highway subtracted by the cost of building and operating
the highway.
The central government is benevolent and maximizing the expected social
welfare minus the out-of-pocket payment to both the residents group and the
local contractor.
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Ug(θ, k, θˆ, kˆ) = Eθ
[
uR(θ, k, θˆ, kˆ) − Xr(θˆ, kˆ)
]
+ Ek
[
uc(θ, k, θˆ, kˆ) − Xc(θˆ, kˆ)
]
If the central government possesses no information in the renegotiation, Xr
and Xc will be determined according to mechanism design theory to ensure par-
ties being truth-telling. If the central governmnet has full information, as it is
possible that the renegotiation may make one party worse off while make the
whole society better off, the government can compensate the utility loss of par-
ties to enable the renegotiation.
Lastly, the official’s utility function is denoted as Uo(θ, k). Her utility func-
tion depends on whether she is selfish or benevolent and what parties she can
collude with. Therefore we will discuss in details in the following sections.
4.2.4 Timing of the model
In this chapter, we assume that both official led (O-led) and contractor led (C-
led) renegotiations are possible. Based on this assumption, the renegotiation
process works as follows.
Before the project starts, the central government will specify the optimal con-
tract and design under different conditions and possible governmental contract
with local official. The original design is determined before the post-tender
phase of project and based on estimation of uncertain factors θE and kE, that
is, βE = β(θE, kE) and γE = γ(θE, kE). After the implementation stage, θ, k and σ
are realized and privately known by the residents group, contractor and local
official, respectively.
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Then the official and contractor simultaneously decide whether to initiate a
renegotiation offer to other parties. If no party decides to initiate the renegotia-
tion, the game ends immediately and the original design (βE, γE) will be carried
out and the utility of residents group and contractor given the realization (θ, k)
will be
UNRR (θ, k) = QF¯(βE, θ)m(θ)(tA − t(γE))
and
UNRc (θ, k) = QF¯(βE, θ)βE(tA − t(γE)) − QF¯(βE, θ)
k
γE
respectively. If only one party decides to initiate the renegotiation, other par-
ties will decide whether to accept or decline the proposal. If both parties decide
to initiate, the offer is randomly selected and other parties will decide whether
to accept or decline the selected one. There is only one opportunity to propose
renegotiation and therefore if the party decides not to initiate or its proposal is
not selected, it will never be able to propose in the current renegotiation process.
If the renegotiation happens, the local official should first report her type
σ˜ ∈ {(θ, k), ∅} to central or state government. If she reports ‘full information’, σ =
(θ, k), the central government is able to get the realization of (θ, k). Otherwise,
in reporting ‘no infromation’ case, the central government let both the residents
group and contractor to report their type θ˜ and k˜ respectively.
In the renegotiation process, the local official will report her type to the cen-
tral government to be either σ = (θ, k) or σ = ∅. If the report type is (θ, k),
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the central government is able to obtain full information. Otherwise, central
government will let the residents group and contractor report their type. The
revision of design will be determined by prespecified design based on the infor-
mation central government obtains.
Finally the design is revised and possible the monetary transfer will be
made. The timeline of the model is shown in Figure 4.1.
The central government deter-
mines renegotiation standard
of contract and design revision
During the pre-tender and
tender phases, the contract
is awarded to the contractor,
initial design is determined
based on estimation θE and kE
At the beginning of post-tender
phase, private information
σ, θ and k are realized and
known by the official, resi-
dents group and contractor
Official and contractor decide
whether to renegotiate
The selected party offers
proposal to other parties
Accept or decline decisions
from other parties
The information is reported ac-
cording to the contract and new
design of the highway is deter-
mined based on the updates and
central government’s standard
No renegotiation. The ini-
tial design is carried out
Both ‘No’
At least on ‘Yes’
At least one ‘No’
Both ‘Yes’
Figure 4.1: The flowchart of renegotiation process
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4.2.5 Social optimal design
Without transfer, the social optimal design under full information can be deter-
mine by the following theorem.
Theorem 12. The solution to the social optimal under full information is
β =
k
a
θ
1 + θ
γ =
a
θ(tA − t0 − a) (4.3)
Proof. This is a straightforward extension of [69] and [45]. For more detailed
proof, interested readers can refer to their papers.
The social welfare without monetary transfer is
Us(θ, k) = QF¯(β, θ)
[
(m(β, θ) + β)(tA − t(γ)) − k
γ
]
(4.4)
The first order condition of (4.4) gives us (4.3).

Corollary 13. Under full information condition, the followings hold:
• β is increasing in θ and increasing in k and γ is decreasing in θ and not influenced
by the cost k;
• The contractor will always get 0 utility after renegotiation;
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• The utility of residents group after renegotiation is
ur(θ, k) = βθ+1
(a
k
)θ (1 + θ
θ
)θ+1
(tA − t0 − a)
• The utility functions of residents group and contractor given the realization of
(θ, k) and estimation (θE, kE) are
ur(θ, k, θE, kE) = βθ+1
(
a
kE
)θ (1 + θE
θE
)θ+1
θE
θ
(tA − t0 − a),
and
uc(θ, k, θE, kE) = βθ+1
(
a
kE
θE + 1
θE
)θ+1
(tA − t0 − a)θEa (kE − k)
Proof. Direct derivation from Theorem 12 
From above corollary, we know that
βa
k
1 + θ
θ
<
βa
k
2 < 1, which means that
ur(θ, k) decreases in θ and k. Therefore the utility of the residents group will be
decreasing with the inequality and the cost of procurement. The contractor will
always get 0 utility from the renegotiation. Also, before renegotiation, both the
residents group and the contractor’s utility decrease in θ. The residents group’s
utility is not influenced by the realization of cost k, but the contractor is worse
off for higher procurement cost.
The following theorem gives the optimal design under no information con-
dition.
Theorem 14. Under no information, the optimal design (βN , γN) becomes
βN ≈ k + Hk(k)
a
θ
1 + θ
φ(θ, k)
γN ≈ a
θ(tA − t0 − a)ψ(θ, k)
(4.5)
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where
φ(θ, k) ≈ 1
1 +
Λ1
1 + θ
ψ(θ, k) =
1 + Λ1 + Λ2
1 − Λ2
θ
Λ1 =
1
2
k + Hk(k)
aβ
θ +
Hθ(θ)
θ
1 − 12 aβHθ(θ)k + Hk(k)

Λ2 =
1
θ
+ Hθ(θ) log
θ(k + Hk(k))φ(θ, k)
aβ(1 + θ)
Proof. Based on Lemma 4 of [45], the optimal solution when central government
does not have information is
(βN , γN) ∈ argmax
β,γ
[(
β
θ
+ β
) (
(tA − t0 − a) + a
γ
)
− k
γ
−
(
(tA − t0 − a) + a
γ
) β(−θ log β + θ log β − 1)
θ2
Hθ(θ)
−Hk(k)
γ
]
Then we can get
βN =

k + Hk(k)
a
θ
1 + θ
, when θ = θ,
exp
W
CBe
A
B
 − AB
 , Otherwise.
where, W is the Lambert W function defined as yey = x ⇒ y = W(x) and
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A =
a
θ
(1 + θ − Hθ(θ)(log β − 1
θ
))
B =
a
θ
Hθ(θ)
C = k + Hk(k)
Because
C
B
e
A
B > e, and from [14], W(x) ≈ log x
log x
for x > e, then the β when
Hθ(θ) , 0 becomes
βN ≈ k + Hk(k)
a
θ
1 + θ
φ(θ, k)
where
φ(θ, k) =
1
1 +
Hθ(θ)
(1 + θ)
1θ + log θ(k + Hk(k))aβHθ(θ)

≈ 1
1 +
Λ1
1 + θ
Λ1 can be calculated as
Λ1 = Hθ(θ)
1θ + log θ(k + Hk(k))aβHθ(θ)

≈ Hθ(θ)
θ
+
1
2
θ(k + Hk(k))aβ − aβ(Hθ(θ))
2
θ(k + Hk(k))

=
1
2
k + Hk(k)
aβ
θ +
Hθ(θ)
θ
1 − 12 aβHθ(θ)k + Hk(k)

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Also we have
γ =

θ
β
(k + Hk(k))
θ2 − 1
θ
− Hθ(θ) log β
β
− a
 (tA − t0 − a)
−1,
=
a
θ(tA − t0 − a)ψ(θ, k)
where ψ(θ, k) =
1 + Λ1 + Λ2
1 − Λ2
θ
with Λ2 =
1
θ
+ Hθ(θ) log
θ(k + Hk(k))φ(θ, k)
aβ(1 + θ)
.

Immediately from Theorem 14, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 15. Under no information case, to make both party truth-telling, the social
optimal toll should smaller than the ‘full information’ case and the VC ratio should be
larger than that.
Proof. As φ(θ, k) < 1, βN < β. As Λ1 and Λ2 are all larger than 1, ψ(θ, k) > 1 and
the γN > γ. 
Corollary 15 indicates that when the central government possesses no in-
formation, both the optimal toll and the VC ratio are distorted to induce truth-
telling
Given the social optimal solution under different information situation, in
the following sections, we will investigate the renegotiation outcomes when the
official is benevolent or selfish.
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4.3 Benevolent official
When the official is benevolent, she will implement the social optimal design in
the renegotiation. The outcome under this condition serves as benchmark of the
following sections. Also, the renegotiation conditions of the benevolent official
are also constraints to the selfish official, that is, the selfish official has to mock
the benevolent official in attempt to not being detected by the central govern-
ment for misconduct. Therefore, even that selfish official finds it attractive to
renegotiate but a benevolent official will not renegotiate, she cannot initiate the
renegotiation.
4.3.1 Full information
When a benevolent official has full information, her utility function is same as
the principal (central or state government), UB,Fo (θ, k) = UB,Fg (θ, k) = ur(θ, k) +
uc(θ, k)− Xr(θ, k)− Xc(θ, k) (As the government official possesses full information,
she does not need to offer parties with information rent and hence the utility of
contractor after renegotiation uc(θ, k) = 0). When the official has full information
about the contractor and the residents group’s types, she will initiate renegotia-
tion process if and only if the new outcome will improve social welfare and also
it will be accepted by the two parties. As initial renegotiation is always costly
to the official and she possesses full information, such proposals will always be
accepted by the two parties. Also, the contractor may also find it attractive to
propose renegotiation when the real cost k is larger. The renegotiation game
outcome is summarized as the following theorem.
Theorem 16. When official is benevolent and informed, the renegotiation game out-
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come is:
• Official will propose renegotiation when(
1 +
1
θ
)1+θ
−
(
1 +
1
θE
)1+θ
θE
12 kE − kkE
(
k
kE
)θ
+
1
θ
 > 0
• Contractor will propose renegotiation when
kE < k
Proof. A benevolent official will only renegotiate if and only if the outcome im-
proves her utility function, which is equivalent to ur(θ, k) − Xc(θ, k) − Xr(θ, k) >
ur(θ, k, θE, kE) + uc(θ, k, θE, kE).
Under the bailout scenario, the residents group is compensated. Then the
social welfare is
2ur(θ, k) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE) − 2ur(θ, k, θE, kE)
=2k−θaθβθ+1
(
1 + θ
θ
)
(tA − t0 − a)
− βθ+1
(
a
kE
θE + 1
θE
)θ+1
(tA − t0 − a)θEa (kE − k)
− 2βθ+1
(a
k
)θ (1 + θE
θE
)θ+1
θE
θ
(tA − t0 − a)
=
(
1 +
1
θ
)1+θ
−
(
1 +
1
θE
)1+θ
θE
12 kE − kkE
(
k
kE
)θ
+
1
θ
 (4.6)
The renegotiation condition is (4.6)> 0.
On the other hand, the contractor may also find the renegotiation attractive
(intuitively, when cost shoots up). The condition of contractor to renegotiate is
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0 = Eθ [uc(k)] > Eθ [uc(k, kE)]. This indicates kE < k. Under this condition, the
contractor will only renegotiate when he needs bail-out. 
Theorem 16 tells us that the contractor will renegotiate when there is an un-
expected shoot-up. However, the official is less likely to bail out the contractor
as the renegotiation condition is (4.6)> 0 which is stricter than k−kE > 0 because
when k 6 kE, (4.6) < 0 ∀ θ.
4.3.2 No information
When the official has no information, her utility function becomes
UB,No (θ, k) = U
B,N
g (θ, k) = Eθ,k [ur(θ, k) + uc(θ, k) − hr(θ) − hc(k)] ,
which is different from its counter part when the official has full information
due to the information asymmetry. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 17. A benevolent official with no information will always renegotiate, but
such proposal may be rejected by the residents group and the contractor. The contractor
when the following inequalities are both satisfied:
Eθ
2Q ( ββN
)θ+1
1
γN
Hk(k)
 > Q ( ββE
)θ+1
1 − ( ββE
)θ¯−θ
γE log
βE
β
(kE − k)
Eθ,k
Qβθ¯+1 (ak
)θ¯ (
1 +
1
θE
)θ¯ 1
θ¯
(1 + θE)(tA − t0 − a)
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−2QHθ(θ)
γNθ2
(
(tA − t0 − a)γN + a
)
βN
( β
βN
)θ+1
(θ log
β
β
− 1)

> Q
( β
βE
)θ+1 kE
1 − ( ββE
)θ¯−θ
γEθ log
βE
β
(4.7)
Proof. As the utility of no renegotiation is still Eθ,k [ur(θ, k, θE, kE) + uc(θ, k, θE, kE)],
she will only renegotiate when
Eθ,k [ur(θ, k) + uc(θ, k) − hr(θ) − hc(k)] >
Eθ,k [ur(θ, k, θE, kE) + uc(θ, k, θE, kE)] (4.8)
Also, such proposal is expected to be accepted by both parties when
Eθ,k[UNR (θ, k)] > Eθ,k[ur(θ, k, θE, kE)]
Eθ,k[UNc (θ, k)] > Eθ,k[uc(θ, k, θE, kE)]
where,2
Eθ,k [ur(θ, k) + uc(θ, k) − hr(θ) − hc(k)]
2Here as we consider a contractor bail-out situation, in the renegotiation problem we set the
utility function of contractor and the residents group as Eθ
[
UNc (θ, k)
]
= 0 and Ek
[
UNr (θ, k)
]
=
Ek[ur(θ, k, θE , kE)], respectively. This ensures the participation as well as consistency with the
reality. Therefore, the utility of highest type (least utility from renegotiation can be cal-
culated through Ek
[
UNr (θ¯, k)
]
= Eθ,k[ur(θ, k, θE , kE)] + Eθ,k
[
Q(tA − t(γ))∂F¯(β, θ)m(β, θ)
∂θ
2Hθ(θ)
]
and
Eθ
[
UNc (θ¯, k)
]
= Eθ,k[uc(θ, k, θE , kE)] + Eθ,k
[
QF¯(β, θ)
1
γ
2Hk(k)
]
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=Eθ,k
2Q
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
− UNr (θ¯, k) − UNc (θ, k¯)

Eθ,k [ur(θ, k, θE, kE) + uc(θ, k, θE, kE)]
=Eθ,k
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− k
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βE
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γEθ log
βE
β
Eθ,k[UNc (θ, k)] = Eθ,k
2Q ( ββN
)θ+1
1
γN
Hk(k)
 + Eθ[uc(θ, k¯, θE, kE)]
Eθ,k[UNr (θ, k)] = Eθ,k
[
UNr (θ¯, k) − Q(tA − t(γ))
∂{F¯(β, θ˜)m(θ˜)}
∂θ
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
]
=Qβθ¯+1
(
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kE
)θ¯ (
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1
θE
)θ¯ 1
θ¯
(1 + θE)(tA − t0 − a)
− Eθ,k
2QHθ(θ)γNθ2 ((tA − t0 − a)γN + a) βN
( β
βN
)θ+1
(θ log
β
β
− 1)

=Eθ[ur(θ¯, k, θE, kE)]
+ Eθ,k
ur(θ, k) ( k(k + Hk(k))φ(θ, k)
)θ (
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θ
ψ(θ, k)
) 1 + θ log βNβ
Hθ(θ)
Eθ,k[uc(θ, k, θE, kE)] = 0
Eθ,k[ur(θ, k, θE, kE)] = Q
( β
βE
)θ+1 kE
1 − ( ββE
)θ¯−θ
γEθ log
βE
β
uNr (θ, k) = Qβ
θ+1 1
βθ
(φ(θ, k))−θ (tA − t0 − a)
(
1
θ
+
1
ψ(θ, k)
)
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uNc (θ, k) = Qβ
θ+1 1
βθ
(tA − t0 − a)
[
1 +
θ
ψ(θ, k)
− 1 + θ
φ(θ, k)ψ(θ, k)
]
which means that
Eθ,k
[
UNr (θ, k)
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= Eθ,k
2Q ( ββN
)θ+1
1
γN
Hk(k)
 > Eθ,k [ur(θ, k)] = 0
Eθ,k
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1
θE
)θ¯ 1
θ¯
(1 + θE)(tA − t0 − a)
−2QHθ(θ)
γNθ2
(
(tA − t0 − a)γN + a
)
βN
( β
βN
)θ+1
(θ log
β
β
− 1)

> Q
( β
βE
)θ+1 kE
1 − ( ββE
)θ¯−θ
γEθ log
βE
β
(4.9)
Both constraints are always satisfied ex ante. However, contractor and the
residents group may reject such proposal ex post. Therefore, an uninformed
government officer attempts to renegotiate when (4.8) is satisfied.
Contractor will renegotiation when Eθ
[
UNc (θ, k)
]
> Eθ [uc(θ, k, θE, kE)] and also
knowing that Eθ,k
[
UNr (θ, k)
]
> Eθ,k [ur(θ, k, θE, kE)], both of which always hold due
to the design of the renegotiation proposal.
This translates to (4.7) 
Notice that (4.7) differs with (4.9) only in the first inequality. The first in-
equality in (4.7) does not rely on the expectation of random variable k which im-
plies that under no information condition, the contractor will not always initiate
renegotiation (but the official will). Therefore, in contrast to the full information
condition, the contractor will renetiate less likely compared to the official.
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Moreover, when the contractor initiate the renegotiation, the proposal will
be easier to pass through due to the information advantage the contractor have
compared to the uninformed government official.
4.4 Selfish official
When official is selfish, her utility function is the personal benefit she will obtain
from the renegotiation. Therefore, the utility function can be written as
US ,Fo = µνcxc(θ, k) + νrxr(θ, k)
where µ is the bargain power of the official, νc is the collusion return coef-
ficient from contractor and νr is the collusion return from the residents group.
µ = 0 when the contractor possesses all the bargain power and the official can
not solicit bribe from contractor through collusion. νc, νr = 1 when the collusion
is ‘frictionless’, i.e. all the bribes going to the official will becomes her personal
benefits while νc, νr = 0 when the collusion is so costly due to auditing or moni-
toring.
4.4.1 Full information
When official is selfish, her utility is the personal gain from the renegotiation
which is in the form of bribe. The official can seek the opportunity of bribe in
two ways: Reporting ‘full information’ and ask the party (or both party) who
gain(s) from renegotiation for bribe (and other party will be compensated for
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loss by the central government), or reporting ‘no information’ and take the extra
utility increase from both parties.
First consider when full information is reported. Under bail-out situation,
the contractor gains utility if renegotiation happens. The utility gain of contrac-
tor from renegotiation is:
∆uS ,F,RFc = uc(θ, k) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE) = βθ+1
(
a
kE
θE + 1
θE
)θ+1
(tA − t0 − a)θEa (k − kE)
The utility gain of residents group is
∆uS ,F,RFr = max{0, ur(θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE)}
= max
0, βθ+1aθ(tA − t0 − a)
(1k
)θ (1 + θ
θ
)1+θ
− θE
θ
(
1
kE
)θ (1 + θE
θE
)1+θ
Then the potential bribe towards the official will be
xr = ∆uS ,F,RFr xc = ∆u
S ,F,RF
c
The utility of official if she reports full information will be
US ,F,RFo (θ, k) = µνc∆u
S ,F
c (θ, k) + νr∆ur(θ, k)
= µνcβ
θ+1
(
a
kE
θE + 1
θE
)θ+1
(tA − t0 − a)θEa (k − kE)
+ νr max
0, βθ+1aθ(tA − t0 − a)
(1k
)θ (1 + θ
θ
)1+θ
− θE
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(
1
kE
)θ (1 + θE
θE
)1+θ
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A sufficient condition is k > kE. This is less strict than the renegotiation
condition of benevolent official (4.6). Hence, by reporting ‘full information’, the
official is constrained by the renegotiation condition of benevolent official.
On the contrary, the utility gain of contractor if official reports ‘no informa-
tion’ is (‘Selfish, Full information, Report No information’)
∆uS ,F,RNc (θ, k) = U
N
c (θ, k) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE)
= 2Q
( β
βN
)θ+1
1
γN
Hk(k) + uc(θ, k¯, θE, kE) − βθ+1
(
a
kE
θE + 1
θE
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(tA − t0 − a)θEa (k − kE)
= 2Q
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βN
)θ+1
1
γN
Hk(k) + βθ+1
(
a
kE
θE + 1
θE
)θ+1
(tA − t0 − a)θEa (k¯ − k)
Similarly the utility gain/loss of the residents group from the potential rene-
gotiation is
∆uS ,F,RNr (θ, k) = U
N
r (θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE)
= ur(θ¯, k, θE, kE) + ur(θ, k)
(
k
(k + Hk(k))φ(θ, k)
)θ (
1 +
θ
ψ(θ, k)
) 1 + θ log βNβ
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(
1
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1 +
θ
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) 1 + θ log βNβ
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1
kE
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θE
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θE
1θ −
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a
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1 + θE
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)θ¯−θ 1
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 ]
Therefore, the utility gain of the official is
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UNo (θ, k) = µνc∆u
S ,F,RN
c (θ, k) + νr∆u
S ,F,RN
r (θ, k)
Now, we can discuss under different scenarios (different combinations of µ,
νr and νc, the outcome of the renegotiation game.
Official colluding with both parties with full bargain power (µ = 1, νr = 1 and
νc = 1)
We have the government official will renegotiate if and only if at least one of the
two following conditions is satisfied:
4.6 > 0
UNo (θ, k) > 0
The official can always report ‘no information’ because uninformed and
benevolent official will always renegotiate. Also, the official will prefer to re-
port ‘no information’ when
UNo (θ, k) − (4.6) = ur(θ, k) + uc(θ, k) − hr(θ) − hc(k)
−
( β
βE
)θ+1
1
γE
(
kE −
(
1 − 1
θ
)
k
)
> 0 (4.10)
Compared to benevolent official, the selfish official will be more likely to
renegotiate. Notice that the official may not be willing to report ‘no information’
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even if she possesses full information. She will report ‘full information’ if (4.10)
does not hold.
Official colluding with both parties with no bargain power (µ = 0, νr = 1 and
νc = 1)
Renegotiation opportunity will provide the contractor Eθ
[
UNc (k)
]
= 0 ex ante.
Notice that the contractor can provide the official with bribe to induce her to
report ‘no information’ in renegotiation, therefore we should check which will
be preferred. If the official report full information, the contractor is expected to
gain from the renegotiation by
Eθ [uc(θ, k)] − Eθ [uc(θ, k, θE, kE)]
=βθ+1
(
a
kE
θE + 1
θE
)θ+1
(tA − t0 − a)θEa (k − kE) (4.11)
This is still dominated by the renegotiation condition when official reports
full information, (4.6)> 0. Therefore, contractor can not always renegotiate
when (4.11) > 0.
If the official reports ‘no information’, the utility gain will be3
Eθ
[
UNc (θ, k) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE)
]
3The contractor will claim all the extra utility and use part of them (larger than 0) as bribe.
However as she don’t have the exact information on the residents group’s type, it is difficult.
It should be, the contractor let the official take all the utility from the residents group, but will
retain his own gain.
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2Q ( ββN
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1
γN
Hk(k)
 − Q ( ββE
)θ+1
1 − ( ββE
)θ¯−θ
γE log
βE
β
(kE − k) (4.12)
As the contract is designed in such a way that when official reports ‘no infor-
mation’ the residents group will always accept the proposal ex ante, the contrac-
tor can always initiate the renegotiation when it increases his utility. Therefore,
contractor-led renegotiation can be summarized as following
• (4.6) > 0 and (4.12) > 0 does not hold, no renegotiation led by contractor;
• Either (4.6) > 0 or (4.12) > 0 holds, but not both:
– (4.6) > 0, contractor will renegotiate without colluding with official;
– (4.12) > 0 holds, contractor will collude with official for reporting ‘no
information’;
• Both condition holds:
– (4.11) > (4.12), contractor leads the renegotiation without colluding
with official;
– (4.11) < (4.12), contractor leads the renegotiation and colludes with
official for reporting ‘no information’.
Above conditions indicate that a fully informed official will be more likely to
lie in a O-led renegotiation than a C-led renegotiation. Also, in a renegotiation
where official reporting ‘no information’, if Eθ[UNc (θ, k)] < 0, no collusion exists.
Although it is impossible for a government with information disadvantage to
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learn Eθ[UNc (θ, k)] because they don’t know the realization k, this gives the super-
vising or auditing authority a guide to discover possible collusion. Moreover,
larger θ induce more likely C-led renegotiation.
Official colluding with only contractor with full bargain power (µ = 1, νr = 0
and νc = 1)
When the selfish official possesses full information, she can only benefit from
the renegotiation with the contractor. Therefore, the renegotiation condition
would be
• If official reports ‘full information’:
UFo (θ, k) = −uc(θ, k, θE, kE) = Q
( β
βE
)θ+1
k − kE
γEθ
> 0
Similarly, this is also constrained by the renegotiation condition when re-
porting ‘full information’, (4.6).
• If official reports ‘no information’:
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− Q
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βE
)θ+1 kE
1 − ( ββE
)θ¯−θ
γEθ log
βE
β
> 0
Incentive of reporting ‘full information’ deos not change in this scenario,
but reporting ‘no information’ becomes less attractive due to the restriction of
unable to collude with residents. Therefore the official will still be more likely
to renegotiate the contract compared to benevolent official. However, she will
be less incentivized compared to official colluding with both parties.
Official colluding with only contractor with no bargain power (µ = 0, νr = 0
and νc = 1)
On the C-led renegotiation side, when official reports full information, the rene-
gotiation condition is not changed. The gain of contractor from the renegotia-
tion is still −uc(θ, k, θE, kE) with the constraint (4.6) > 0. Because C-led renegoti-
ation will not give a official reporting full information any extra benefit on the
contractor side, not being able to collude with the residents group ensures that
there will be no benefit for official through collusion.
However, when official reporting ‘no information’, contractor will still find
it attractive to propose renegotiation. However, the renegotiation does happen
less likely. This is due to the fact that the official can not compensate the resi-
dents group’s possible utility loss using the utility gain from the contractor side
and the renegotiation condition will be stricter. As reporting ‘no information’
always brings social welfare loss when official is fully informed, reduced op-
portunity of such renegotiation will benefit the society in general.
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Official colluding with only residents group (µ = 1 or 0, νr = 1 and νc = 0)
When the official can only collude with residents group, it is impossible for the
contractor to influence the official’s decision. Under contractor bail-out situa-
tion, reporting ‘full information’ is never attratice to a selfish official because
she can not benefit from it any more. On the contrary, by reporting ‘no infor-
mation’, a fully informed official can breach the information rent from central
government to residents group. Therefore, a fully informed official will always
prefer reporting ‘no information’. A side effect of this behavior of official is that
the contractor do not need to collude with official to induce higher benefit (if
possible).
The renegotiation constraints are not changed under this scenario for both
‘no information’ and ‘full information’ cases.
4.4.2 No information
When the official has no information, she will not be willing to initiate the rene-
gotiation because there will be no personal gain from it.
For the contractors, the renegotiation condition is (4.12) > 0, which is same
as benevolent case.
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4.5 Selfish official colluding with part of residents
As previous chapter states, the required monetary transfer from official to resi-
dents group H is
Eθ [xh(θ)] = Uh(θ¯) − uh(θ¯) + Eθ,k
[
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On the other hand, the monetary transfer central government distributes to
the residents group ‘h’ is
Eθ [Xh(θ)]
= (UR(θ¯) − uR(θ¯))Eθ
[
F¯(β0, θ)
]
+ Eθ,k
[
QF¯(β, θ)F¯(β0, θ)m(θ)
∂t(γ)
∂θ
Gθ(θ)
gθ(θ)
]
= Ek
Q ( ββ0
)θ¯
β0
θ¯
a(
1 − γ(θE, kE)
γ(θE, kE)
− 1 − γ
N(θ¯, k)
γN(θ¯, k)
)
 ( ββ0
)θ
1
log
β
β0
− Eθ,k
2Q
(β
β
)θ ( β
β0
)θ (
β0
θ
+ β0 − βN(θ¯, k)
) ∂γN(θ, k)
∂θ
(γN(θ, k))2
Hθ(θ)

As we assumed that β < β0, Eθ[Xh(θ, k)] < Eθ[xh(θ, k)]. This indicates that the
official can not directly use the central government’s fund to induce truth telling
within the residents group. This naturally can reduce the chance of collusion
when official has no information.
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On the other hand, if official colludes with only the residents group ‘l’ (low)
with VOT less than β1, she will not be interested in reporting full information
because in that way she will not be benefit from it. On the other hand, she
will always report ‘no information’ when it is possible (i.e. the condition of
benevolent renegotiation is possible) because she can confiscate the monetary
transfer from central government to residents group ‘l’.
4.6 Anti-corruption program
In the previous sections, the outcomes of renegotiation games are derived.
Given the bribe between official, contractor and the residents group, the central
government can set up an anti-corruption program to incentivize the official to
honestly report her type. As we state above, our focus is the scenario of con-
tractor bailout under unexpected cost shoot-up or insufficient demand. In this
section, we will derive such program given the results in previous sections. We
will examine how would the central government setup the bailout program.
We consider two different approaches to fight against collusion. One is pro-
viding the official incentives for truth-telling, which let her voluntarily give up
the opportunity to collude with contractor or the residents group. Such measure
helps to obtain information from the official and hence brings benefit to the soci-
ety. On the other hand, implementing this measure requires the central govern-
ment to provide personal benefit (such as salary, promotion opportunity, etc.)
to the official, which is costly. From literature of mechanism design, the cost
of such incentive is distortion of the social optimal design. Denote the bonus
of reporting ‘full information’ as Xo(θ, k). Such burden may annihilate welfare
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gain. The central government’s utility, i.e. social welfare from the renegotiation,
is the sum of utility of both parties extracted by bonus and compensation to the
residents group, which is
Ug = ur(θ, k) + uc(θ, k) − Xo(θ, k) − Xr(θ, k) − Xc(θ, k)
Another way is to restrict the collusion by regulation and supervision. As
we discussed in previous sections, official may collude with different party or
one part of a party (for example, potential users of new infrastructure or in
other case, non-union worker). Therefore, the effectiveness of anti-corruption
program is various under different collusion types and in the following section
we also compare the benefit such regulation and supervision brings.
4.6.1 Official colluding with both parties
When the official colludes with both parties. In the O-led renegotiation, when
the renegotiation condition is satisfied, the official’s payoff is
S o = max{0,UNo (θ, k) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE)}
= max{0,UNc (θ, k) + UNr (θ, k) − 2uc(θ, k, θE, kE) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE)}
Notice that the official will only initiate an O-led renegotiation whenever
S o > 0. Also, in the anti-corruption program, to ensure that the official is truth-
telling the central government should provide her with transfer at least equal to
S o, which will be naturally binding.
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Xo = S o = UNc (θ, k) + U
N
r (θ, k) − 2uc(θ, k, θE, kE) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE) (4.13)
Equation (4.13) indicates that the social welfare after implementing the anti-
corruption program is 2ur(θ, k) − UNr (θ, k) − UNc (θ, k) + 2uc(θ, k, thetaE, kE) which is
larger than the social welfare if the official reports ‘no information’: 2uNr (θ, k) −
UNc (θ, k) − UNr (θ, k).
In a C-led renegotiation, if the official reports ‘full information’ there will be
no corruption happening. However, when the official reports ‘no information’,
corruption may exist when (4.11) < (4.12). Therefore, the central government
should reward the official who report ‘full information’ by the possible utility
gain for her, which is
S c =(4.12) − (4.11) + UNr (θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE)
=UNc (θ, k) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE)
It is obviously that Vo > Vc, which means that it is costlier to prevent O-led
renegotiation than C-led one because the bonus paid to the official is higher.
The social welfare after implementing this (superscript ‘B’ denotes both
party)
∆UB =ur(θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE)
−max
{
0,UNc (θ, k) + U
N
r (θ, k) − 2uc(θ, k, θE, kE) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE)
}
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−max {0, ur(θ, k, θE, kE) − ur(θ, k)}
When the central government has to compensate the residents group for util-
ity loss (ur(θ, k) < ur(θ, k, θE, kE)) and simultaneously award the government offi-
cial for reporting ‘full information’, the change in utility becomes:
∆UBa =ur(θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE)
− UNc (θ, k) + UNr (θ, k) − 2uc(θ, k, θE, kE) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE)
− ur(θ, k, θE, kE) − ur(θ, k)
=2ur(θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE) + uc(θ, k, θE, kE) − UNc (θ, k) − UNr (θ, k)
If no anti-corruption program is implemented, ∆U becomes
∆UBc =u
N
r + u
N
c − hr − hc
=2uNr + 2u
N
c − UNr − UNc
where
uNc (θ, k) = Q
F¯(βN , θ)
γ
[
(k + Hk(k))φ(θ, k)
ψ(θ, k) + θ
1 + θ
− k
]
uNr (θ, k) = Q
F¯(βN , θ)
γN
(k + Hk(k))φ(θ, k)
ψ(θ, k)
θ
+ 1
1 + θ
It is possible that under this condition Eθ,k∆UBa < Eθ,k∆UBc . This will always
be the case when
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2
QF¯(βN , θ)
γN
[
(k + Hk(k))φ(θ, k)
(
ψ(θ, k)
θ
+ 1
)
− k
]
>
2
QF¯(β, θ)
γ
1
θ
− QF¯(βE, θ)
γE
kE
θ
+ Q
F¯(β, θ)
γ
(kE − k)
which means that implementing anti-corruption program may induce
higher social welfare loss, although it can deter the official from reporting no
information.
4.6.2 Official colluding with only contractor
When the official only colludes with the contractor, the O-led renegotiation will
give her −uc(θ, k, θE, kE) by reporting full information and UNc (θ, k)−uc(θ, k, θE, kE)
by reporting no information. Therefore to induce truth-telling, the central gov-
ernment should provide the official with UNc (θ, k).
On the other hand, in a C-led renegotiation, the official gets nothing from
reporting full information but realizes personal gain of UNc (θ, k) − uc(θ, k) by re-
porting no information. Therefore, incentive given to the official is larger in O-
led renegotiation. Compared with the official colluding with both parties, the
official colluding with only contractor, lying in O-led renegotiation has higher
incentive. Then the utility change of implementing anti-corruption program
will be
∆UC = ur(θ, k) + uc(θ, k) − UNc (θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE)
This indicates that the gain from regulating the interaction between the res-
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idents group and official is max{UNr (θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE), 0}. This value equals 0
when there is no renegotiation.
4.6.3 Official colluding with only the residents group
In O-led renegotiation, the official will gain UNr (θ, k) − ur(θ, k, θE, kE) from misre-
porting her type. Interestingly, the official will gain exactly the same value in
C-led renegotiation. Then the utility change from implementation of the pro-
gram will be
ur(θ, k) + uc(θ, k) − UNr (θ, k) − uc(θ, k, θE, kE)
The improvement from regulating the contractor is UNc (θ, k). This indicates
that the benefit from restricting contractor is higher than restricting the residents
group. Therefore, regulating the private party should have higher priority than
regulating the public.
4.7 Government policy insights and implications
From the discussion of previous sections, we have already investigated the out-
come of renegotiation game and benefit and cost of anti-corruption program
through providing official with incentives to be truth-telling or direct supervi-
sion on the interaction between official and other parties. In this section, we will
discuss how these quantitative results would guide the design of government
policy or governmental contracts.
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Contractor should be endowed with sufficient bargain power in
renegotiation
In section 4.4, when the contractor leads the renegotiation, although the official
still has opportunity to achieve personal gain through collusion with the con-
tractor, it is largely restricted compared to the O-led renegotiation case. This is
due to the fact that, in C-led renegotiation, the contractor has full bargain power
and hence seeking bribes is harder for the official in the renegotiation process.
Equal or higher bargain power between government official and contractor has
already been identified as a factor contributing to the success of a PPP project.
Moreover, here we identify that it is also a factor to curb corruption in post-
tender phase renegotiation.
Regulation and supervision of provider is more effective than
user groups
It is obvious that the less opportunity the official can collude, the less likely the
renegotiation will occur. For example, the renegotiation is less likely to happen
when the official can only collude with only one party compared to the official
can collude with both parties. This indicates that the central government should
closely monitor all the stakeholders in a PPP project and prevent collusion to
happen as much as possible. However, resources are limited and monitor may
not be comprehensive and perfect. The government may be faced with tradeoff
between monitor only some set of parties among all stakeholders of PPP project.
Under this situation, this chapter suggests that regulation and supervision of
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different parties may have different yield for the central government.
As suggested in Section 4.6, regulation or supervision on contractor (collu-
sion only exists between official and the residents group) will achieve higher so-
cial welfare compared to one on the residents group (official colludes only with
contractor). This is understandable from previous point we made: restricting
the possible collusion between official and contractor can prevent the govern-
ment utilize its bargain power in O-led renegotiation and hence it is equivalent
to awarding bargain power to contractor. This implies that, when the govern-
ment has limited supervision ability, which is true in some developing coun-
tries, in PPP renegotiation the focus of regulation and supervision should be
put on the providers, rather than the user groups.
Effectiveness of regulation based on users heterogeneity
This chapter also reveals the importance and effectiveness of taking user het-
erogeneity into consideration in post tender phase renegotiation. In Section 4.5,
by restricting the collusion between official and residents group ‘l’, the official
almost have no incentive to collude in renegotiation process. On the other hand,
if the official is able to collude with only residents group ‘l’, the collusion and
also the renegotiation will always happen. Therefore, we suggest that in reg-
ulating the corruption in renegotiation of PPP, the government should weight
on the regulation of non-users of the new infrastructure. The central govern-
ment in this chapter does not account for user heterogeneity and therefore leave
opportunity to the official to obtain personal gain by colluding with residents
group ‘l’.
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Limitation of anti-corruption program
In Section 4.6, we develop a anti-corruption program to fight against the collu-
sion under the context of information asymmetry. Although such program can
prevent the official to deliberately distort her report and hence prevent collu-
sion between official and the residents group, it has two main limitations. The
first limitation is that it sometimes can actually induce social welfare loss. In
section 4.6.1, it is possible that implementing anti-corruption program through
governmental contract will incur social welfare loss ex post compared to letting
collusion happen without an anti-corruption program. This indicates that the
central government actually take more risk in PPP project with the presence of
collusion.
Another shortcoming of such anti-corruption program is that it can not fully
exclude corruption between government official and the contractor. When the
contractor is bailed out in a PPP renegotiation, even the anti-corruption pro-
gram is in place, the contractor still has the incentive to bribe to the government
official for possible financial rescue. Therefore, supervision and regulation is
still always necessary and more effective than incentive programs in fighting
against collusion because they not only can deal with the asymmetric informa-
tion problem, but can also prevent the official to solicit bribe from a financial
depressed contractor for bail-out.
Governmental contracts vs regulation
In Section 4.6, we discuss the social welfare change using different combination
of governmental contracts and regulation. Notice that we make no assumption
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on the monitoring and supervision cost of colluding between official and the
residents group and contractor. This is because such cost varies largely among
differnet countries or even different subnational jurisdiction. However, we can
still compare the social welfare change under different scenarios to contrast the
effectiveness of these two measures. For example, by regulating the private
party, the contractor, central government can guarantee a utility gain of UNc (θ, k)
which implies that as long as the regulation cost is no higher than this amount,
central government should prefer regulation than governmental contract.
4.8 Main Findings
One major finding is that in PPP, the private side should be endowed with more
bargain power to reduce the degree of corruption. When the contractor pos-
sesses full bargain power, the official can not benefit from interacting with the
contractor, which has two benefits: first, it directly reduces the return for the
official because one of the major benefit of renegotiation is the bribe from the
contractor; second, it reduces the monitoring cost on the interaction between
the official and the contractor.
Also, we discover that, given the same regulation cost, in a bail-out event,
it is most efficient to monitor the parties who are financially depressed. In this
chapter, a contractor bail-out event is studied and it turns out that monitoring
the interaction between the official and contractor is more effective than the one
between official and residents. This is because in bail-out, the contractor is the
stakeholder that benefit the most and hence has the largest incentive to bribe
the official.
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Moreover, we identify two limitation of anti-corruption program through
governmental contract. The first limitation is that it may induce negative so-
cial welfare when the estimated cost is low and ex post utility to the contrac-
tor is high. Under this condition, the central government should monitor the
contractor closely rather than attempt to use governmental contract to prevent
corruption. Another limitation is that, anti-corruption program through gov-
ernmental contract can not completely eliminate corruption. The contractor still
has incentive to bribe the official when it is financially distressed.
Last but not least, by considering user heterogeneity, we discover that al-
lowing the collusion only between official and the new infrastructure users can
directly prevent collusion. This is because the cost of collusion is always higher
than possible information rent the users can get from the central government.
4.9 Contributions
The contribution is three-fold:
Firstly, we build a framework taking into account all determining factors,
including stakeholder interaction, asymmetric information, decentralized pro-
curement, etc., of corruption problem in PPP. To our best knowledge, it is the
first of its kind. Such a framework connects different existing literature cover-
ing corruption problem in infrastructure investment and management. Hence,
it can draw us a comprehensive picture of how corruption happens in infras-
tructure project and how the central government can deal with it.
Secondly, our model specifies an indirect mechanism that can be imple-
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ment in real world governmental contract. Previous studies usually emphasizes
on the policy insights and hence focus on highly abstracted direct mechanism
([30]). Their conclusion is insightful but is not readily available for practition-
ers. On the other hand, our results, given by indirect mechanism, specifies how
the central government can design contracts with its official, contractor or even
residents group to prevent corruption in infrastructure projects.
Lastly, we contribute to the literature of post-tender phase corruption in PPP.
As pointed out by [48] and [47], the study of corruption in post-tender phase
corruption is scant 4. This chapter provides detail guides for the government on
how to prevent corruption in post-tender phase renegotiation.
4[48] and [45] are the only two exceptions.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 Final remarks
In infrastructure procurement, corruption is proven to be one of the most se-
rious problems that not only harm the infrastructure level, but also impair
the public trust. Stakeholder management, decentralization and accountabil-
ity have been identified as three most important literature field and aspects of
research in infrastructure procurement. In this dissertation, we build a concep-
tual framework incorporating these key factors to tackle the corruption problem
in infrastructure management. This framework is applied to cost overrun prob-
lem and renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership. Although we have been
building models under different context, we can get some general insights from
these applications.
First and foremost, the results in above chapters illustrates the importance
incorporating stakeholder management, decentralization and accountability in
infrastructure procurement modeling. In Chapter 2, we mainly consider stake-
holder management where the residents group has a huge impact on the offi-
cial’s decision. Therefore, infrastructure decision is distorted and sub-optimal
cost overrun occurs. Further, in Chapter 3, we consider the impact of central
government fund as well as the contractor. The situation becomes more compli-
cated that the incentive contract may not be effective under some circumstances.
In Chapter 4, we discuss that, when contractor may possess bargain power, it is
socially beneficial to endow such power to restrict the possibility of collusion.
Also, the use of central government fund in renegotiation, a feature of decen-
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tralized procurement, will further facilitate the corruption.
From the models, we find out that awareness raising is important to curb
misconduct among officials. For example, in Chapter 2, raising the awareness
of cost of infrastructure spending can reduce the degree of corruption. This
is because, the local residents usually regard the spending on infrastructure as
free because it is usually funded by central government. However, when local
official use the local funding, it is actually a cost on the local residents group.
In this dissertation, we show that auditing or monitoring is an effective way
to curb corruption. Although incentivizing the local official through govern-
mental contract is regarded as a promising way in fighting against corruption,
it has limitation compared to auditing or monitoring the official directly. This
is because under decentralization environment, the central government fund is
used to bail out the contractor. Therefore, the contractor has strong incentive
to bribe the official in order to enable the renegotiation. Incentive governmen-
tal contract is unable to stop this sort of corruption. Therefore, auditing and
monitoring should be relied on.
In the models, we consider user heterogeneity, which turns out to be vital
in corruption context. We discover that, by restricting the possible collusion
with free riders among users, central government stops collusion behavior of
official without implementing any incentive contract. On the other hand, if the
collusion is only possible with free riders, the degree of corruption will turn out
to be more severe.
We also discover that corruption or misconduct is inevitable in infrastructure
projects. This implies that the central government should not purely rely on
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ex post measures to fight against corruption because the measure itself is not
perfect. Ex ante approaches, such us raising awareness of the public, improve
ethical standard of officials and change the social culture that breeds corruption
in the long term should be adopted.
Lastly, this dissertation provides a general way to model the infrastructure
projects in other situations. Researcher and industrial practitioners can estab-
lish their own model and follow the work flow in this dissertation: benevolent
case as a benchmark and consider selfish official case. After that, prevention
measures can be discussed.
5.2 Cost overrun
In chapter 2, we build a 3-factor-2-stage model to reveal the difference between
cost overrun induced by technical uncertainty and the one by political or eco-
nomic drivers. We classify the cost overrun problem in infrastructure projects
into two categories: ex-ante and ex-post cost overrun. Ex-ante cost overrun
occurs at the decision stage (first stage) when the estimated cost is relatively
smaller than the real cost. On the contrary, ex-post cost overrun occurs at the re-
alization stage where the infrastructure is under-invested in decision stage and
then expanded in realization stage which will incur extra cost.
Building, financing operating and maintaining the infrastructure will gener-
ate both positive utility and negative utility on different groups of stakehold-
ers, especially residents and travelers. We discover that the presence of un-
certainty and heterogeneity facilitates the government officer to build political
credit by utilizing infrastructure project. Such motivation will cause under-
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estimated or under-designed decisions, which will induce cost overrun. The
under-estimated decisions are usually made by the officers who try to disguise
the social cost or exaggerate population benefiting from the newly built infras-
tructure ([33]). The officer will claim that the estimated cost is relatively low and
propose a higher design plan. In the realization stage after the infrastructure be-
ing finished, the real cost will be higher than the estimated one and ex-ante cost
overrun occurs.
Another form of cost overrun, ex-post cost overrun, is induced by under-
designed decisions. Such decision comes from the jurisdiction where residents
are fully aware of negative externality of the infrastructure although building
the infrastructure is socially optimal. The government officer, trying to gain
more supporters from the region affected by negative externality, scales down
the design of infrastructure. This decision may lead to insufficient capacity, lack
of security measures, etc. After the realization stage, when the extra demand is
revealed by accidents or media coverage, contract is revised and extra work is
done.
From our analysis, cost overrun is inevitable. Even the benevolent officer
will make decisions inducing both ex-ante and ex-post cost overrun. However,
such benevolent decision should be distinguished from the selfish decisions
from two aspects: Firstly, the extent of cost overrun of benevolent decisions
is less than the selfish ones, and secondly, the cost overrun from benevolent de-
cisions has both ex-ante cost overrun and ex-post cost overrun, while the selfish
ones may be strongly biased towards one category.
We also study the effectiveness of auditing in correcting the cost overrun
problem. Although audit is widely regarded as a measure to prevent cost over-
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run, our result shows that if the central government could not make enough
impact on the local residents, even the optimal audit mechanism could not pre-
vent under-estimated or under-designed decision problems.
In chapter 2, we not only analyze the cost overrun problem in transporta-
tion infrastructure projects, but also build a modeling framework for study in
cost overrun in generic infrastructure projects, mega projects, or even Olympic
Games ([37]). We emphasize the importance of indirect indicator in the study of
cost overruns.
5.3 Renegotiation in PPP
In Chapter 3, we discuss the collusion problem in a government-led renegoti-
ation game in post-tender phase of a PPP project. The central government is
unable to directly negotiate with the residents group or contractor of the project
and therefore has to delegate them to a local official who is prone to corruption.
In the game, we discover that a benevolent local official will be less likely to
initiate a renegotiation compared to a selfish official because she does not have
the ability to balance gain and loss between agents. To alleviate the negative
effect of collusion, restricting the collusion ability of official will be helpful; that
is, make the official only able to collude with one single party. This will reduce
the renegotiation probability to the same level as benevolent and uninformed
official. We also pointed out that, if we can further restrain the collusion to
certain party within residents group, the unfavorable effect of collusion can be
further confined because of the existence of free rider (i.e. other party within the
residents group).
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We report that the government official will prefer higher bidding cost in the
tender phase if her collusion opportunity is confined to the residents group H.
This indicates that she will not always choose the bidder with lowest bid ex
ante, which can be proved through the observation that the bidder with the
lowest bid will not always win the auction of concession contract.
We also suggest that the central government should evaluate the efficacy and
cost of anti-corruption program using incentive contracts. Although incentive
contract seems to be effective in reduce the chance of corruption, it requires the
central government know exactly who the official can collude with. If incentive
is provided mistakenly, such anti-corruption program will ironically encourage
collusion when official can not beneift from collusion originally.
One effective (ex post) measure to detect collusion is monitoring the out-
come of renegotiation games. If the government-led renegotiation is always
successful and the official reports ‘no information’ constantly, it is a strong sign
of possible corruption.
The corruption in post-tender phase of PPP is not well studied. That chapter
extends existing theory in mechanism design, incorporating both and economic
models and provides insightful policy implications and regulation guidelines.
5.4 Stakeholder management, decentralization and agency
problem
As pointed out in Chapter 1, stakeholder management, decentralization and
agency problems are three key factors in evaluating and tackling corruption
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problems in infrastructure projects. In chapter 4, we build a framework to study
corruption in infrastructure procurement accounting for stakeholder interac-
tion, decentralization and information asymmetry. The government, contractor
and residents group considered in that chapter are regarded as the most impor-
tant stakeholders in infrastructure projects. Further, the government is divided
into central government and local government official. The contractor possesses
potential bargain power in the negotiation with government official and the res-
idents group can influence the decision of infrastructure projects through the
official. Moreover, all parties except central government possesses private in-
formation.
We apply this model to study how corruption can influence the outcome of
post-tender phase renegotiation and how central government can prevent this.
Based on our results, central government should not rely on solving collusion
problem through governmental contract. Monitoring and audit are necessary to
eliminate collusion in renegotiation. We also discover that restrict the official’s
collusion ability to only infrastructure users can largely eliminate the corruption
problem.
5.5 Future directions
5.5.1 Cost overrun
One future research direction is that applying the framework in chapter 2 into
real cost overrun problem analysis. In that chapter, although we theoretically
illustrates the ability of the model in cost overrun problem, the effectiveness is
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not verified in real world case. By doing so, we could also be able to identify the
root cause of the cost overrun of that type of problem.
Another future direction is incorporating psychological consideration into
the same framework. Although for simplicity, we do not consider the psycho-
logical issue in cost overrun problem, out framework is capable of psychological
issue. By enriching the framework, there will be more interesting findings and
more comprehensive results.
5.5.2 Renegotiation in PPP
Chapter 3 is a good starting point for research in corruption of PPP in post-
tender phase and some interesting directions worth further exploration. The
first direction is the interaction between the residents group and the contractor.
In that chapter, we assume that two agents, the residents group and the con-
tractor don’t know each other’s type. Furthermore, we assume that these two
groups can not collude. These are assumptions that can be relaxed and we can
explore how the official would react to the possible collusion in lower level and
how the central government can possibly regulate this.
Another direction is generalize the current model to multiple agents case. In
the real world PPP projects, the number of stakeholders is far larger than four,
as we assumed in this chapter. To achieve full perspective of the real world PPP,
incorporating more stakeholders, such as bank or financing source provider,
workers union, etc, would be promising. Enriching the engineering details in
our model can also be a fruitful directions.
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5.5.3 Stakeholder management, decentralization and agency
problems
There are several possible future directions: first, our framework is capable to
problems in more complex environment. For example, stakeholder manage-
ment of real world PPP projects usually also involves creditor, debt holder, other
governmnet departments, etc. It is interesting and practical to build a model
also incorporate these stakeholders to see how to quantitatively evaluate the
impact of each stakeholder on the projects.
Another possible direction is, due to lack of real world data of incidence of
corruption, it is promising to identify more flags or indications for discovering
corruption in PPP projects and our framework could be a good starting point.
As we identify in [45], corrupted official can be identified statistically through
multiple projects. This will be another key step to bridge the theoretical and
empirical studies of corruption.
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